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INTRODUCTION
When one of my young children and I build something with blocks or
LegosTMl (the current favorite), we succeed because the shapes with which we
work are unambiguous. Their contours are clearly defined. Most of the pieces
are rigid, but even those that are flexible have constant characteristics and
predictable applications. When employed for a particular purpose, the pieces
do not disappoint. Legal principles are not much like blocks or LegosTM, even
* Professor and Herff Chair of Excellence in Law, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law,
The University of Memphis. The author expresses his appreciation to Eugene Anderson,
William Barker, Amanda Esquibel, Roger Henderson, Bill Kratzke, Ernest Lidge, Ellen S.
Pryor, and Irma Russell for their comments on earlier drafts. He also thanks Phoebe McGlynn
and Lee Angela Holcomb for their research assistance. In the interest of full disclosure, the
author notes that he has occasionally consulted with attorneys for both policyholders and
insurers regarding insurance contract interpretation and other issues.
1. "LegoT M'" refers to a brick-shaped plastic building block (as well as many other shapes)
with studs on top and tubes underneath. The interface of these bricks, etc., results in a snugness
that allows large assemblies to hold together without becoming fused; the bricks pull apart
almost as easily as they snap together. For more information, visit the LegoTM website at
www.lego.com.
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if we often wish they were. True, we sometimes refer to rules of law as
"building blocks"2 and we use these rules and corollary ideas to build elaborate
structures (or "models" or "paradigms"). Beckoned, perhaps, by recollection
of a time when the problems with which we dealt seemed simpler, we
sometimes invoke the geometry of childhood play to explain legal
relationships. Thus, many writers have explored the terrain of the triangle-
the relationship of insurer, insured, and defense counsel.3 Professor Tom
Baker is correct to urge that the triangle's geometry is too simple to illustrate
adequately all of the complexity inherent in insurers' defense of policyholders
under liability insurance contracts, and he offers the tetrahedron as the
appropriate geometric explanation. 4  Because a four-cornered three-
dimensional shape figured less prominently in our childhood construction
projects, most of us are less comfortable with the tetrahedron, but this is how
it should be, for there is plenty to be uncomfortable about in the area of
insurance defense.
Geometry works, at least in my reckoning, only when there is certainty
with respect to certain assumptions. If some elements of these assumptions or
the assumptions themselves are soft or disputed, the larger structure is unstable
or even shapeless. As a metaphor for law in action, this will not do; the
geometry must be Euclidean, because non-Euclidean geometry, like Chaos
Theory and Cosmology, makes most of us very uncomfortable. Yet this is, in
fact, the heart of the problem in assessing the ethical responsibilities of defense
counsel. Too many fundamental assumptions are contested, and too many are
2. See, e.g., Scott v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 172, 178 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The obligation of an
agency to follow its own regulations is the primary building block of administrative law"),
overruled by Bauzo v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 917 (7th Cir. 1986); See also In re Federal Skywalk
Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 420 (W.D. Mo. 1982) ("The Court views [Fed. R. Civ. P.] Rule 23 as
the key building block in the federal courts' continuing effort to make the civil procedure
system more responsive to the needs of contemporary litigation"), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th
Cir. 1982); Continental Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 561 S.W.2d 460, 464 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1977) ("Applicable equitable principles will be the building blocks of the Court's
decision"); State v. Collins, 409 S.E.2d 181, 200 (W. Va. 1990) (Workman, J., dissenting)
("One must admire the skillful manner in which the majority makes subtle mischaracterizations
and then uses them as tiny little building blocks with which to construct major new principles
of law.")
3. See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the Eternal Triangle of Insurance Defense
Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475 (1996); Robert E. O'Malley, Ethics Principles for the
Insurer, the Insured, and Defense Counsel: The Eternal Triangle Reformed, 66 TUL. L. REV.
511 (1991); Robert B. Gilbreath, Caught in a Crossfire Preventing and Handling Conflicts of
Interest: Guidelines for Texas Insurance Defense Counsel, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 139, 142
(1996) (describing the "triangular model").
4. Tom Baker, Liability Insurance Conflicts of Interest and Defense Lawyers: From
Triangles to Tetrahedrons, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 101 (1997).
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murky. Fortunately, much recent work in this area sheds important light on
these issues, and a real possibility exists that a more stable geometric metaphor
is imminent. Professor Baker, for example, deserves praise for taking us closer
to that objective.
This paper examines some of the assumptions on which many
contemporary assessments of defense counsel's relationship with the insurer
and the policyholder rest, contends that some of the current turmoil in this area
is traceable to shaky assumptions, and argues that the drafting of clearer
liability insurance contracts would add stability to the relationships. Part I
briefly describes the current uncertainty confronting policyholders and defense
counsel. Part II explores what the most widely-used liability insurance
contracts say about the responsibilities of insurance defense counsel,
examining both the context in which these policies are sold and the texts
themselves. It contends that current liability policies do not support a dual-
client model when conflicts between insurer and policyholder arise. Part EIf
discusses the ramifications of the conclusion reached in Part II. In brief, those
who have concluded that counsel owes his or her allegiance to the policyholder
in such circumstances have reached the right conclusion. Clearer liability
insurance contracts would be helpful, however, in affirming this answer--or
providing a different one if the insurance industry believes the current weight
of opinion has reached the wrong result.
I. THE UNCERTAIN IMPLICATIONS OF UNCERTAIN RULES
Although in some states the rules appear clear5 even if some commentators
think the rules are clearly wrong,6 the range of answers to the simple question
"whom does defense counsel represent" is surprisingly broad. In many cases,
it is said that defense counsel's only client is the insured, and that the insurer
is not a client.7 In other cases, courts have said that both insurer and insured
5. See, e.g., In re Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d 322 (Tenn. 1995); MGM, Inc. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 77 (Kan. 1993); White Mountain Constr. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 631
A.2d 907 (N.H. 1993).
6. For a spirited critique of precedents in Texas, Tennessee, and California, see Charles
Silver & Michael S. Quinn, Wrong Turns on the Three Way Street: Dispelling Nonsense About
Insurance Defense Lawyers, 5 COVERAGE I (Nov./Dec. 1995).
7. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Lappies, 828 F. Supp. 6, 7 (D.N.H. 1993) ("When an attorney is
retained by an insurance company to provide a defense under a liability policy, the attorney's
client is the insured, not the insurer."); Booth v. Continental Ins. Co., 634 N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1995); In re Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d 322 (Tenn. 1995); L&S Roofing Supply Co.,
Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 521 So. 2d 1298 (Ala. 1987); Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co. v.
Bell, 475 N.W.2d 294 (Mich. 1991); Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 77 (Tex. App. 1994)
(citing Employers Cas. Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552, 558 (Tex. 1973) ("There is no attorney-
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are clients of the defense counsel; the representation is, or at least can be, joint,
at least until a conflict between the interests of insurer and insured arise.' The
Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide no answer.9 This kind of
contradiction is precisely the circumstance where academics are inclined to
come to the rescue and provide the clarity so lacking in the cases. Indeed,
many recent works in addition to the other papers in this symposium shed
important light on the question. But one who desires the comfort of a
consensus will not find relief in these works.' 0
For an attorney, few things are as fundamental as understanding whom he
or she represents and the precise scope of that representation. The
ramifications for lawyers who misunderstand the nature of these
responsibilities can be enormous. Such was the situation facing defense
counsel in one recent case"' who found himself a witness in the insured's suit
against the insurer for bad faith refusal to settle. When asked at trial about his
role as defense counsel, he said, "I was employed by them [the insurer]."' 2
Initially, he explained that this employment entailed some duties he owed to
the insurer, but that his "first duty"-presumably meaning his primary
responsibility-was owed to the insured. 3 He later qualified this answer by
stating that his "only duty" ran to the insured, necessarily suggesting that no
client relationship between an insurer and an attorney hired by the insurer just to provide a
defense to one of the insurer's insureds")).
8. See, e.g., Home Indem. Co. v. Lane, Powell, Moss & Miller, 43 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir.
1995) (applying Alaska law); Rogers v. Robson, 392 N.E.2d 1365 (I11. App. Ct. 1979); Moritz
v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Wis. 1977); Moeller v. Am. Guar. & Liab.
Ins. Co., 1996 WL 532387 (Miss. Sept. 19, 1996). See also N.C. STATE BAR REVISED RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 91 (1991) ("Whenever defense counsel is employed by an
insurance company to defend an insured against a claim, he or she represents both insurer and
insured.").
9. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 46-403 at 2
(1996) [hereinafter Formal Op. 96-403] ("The Model Rules of Professional Conduct offer
virtually no guidance as to whether a lawyer retained and paid by an insurer to defend its
insured represents the insured, the insurer, or both.").
10. See, e.g., Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of
Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255 (1995) (supporting dual client model); Charles
Silver & Michael S. Quinn, Are Liability Carriers Second-Class Clients? No, But They May
Be Soon-A Call to Arms Against the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, 6
COVERAGE 21 (Mar./Apr. 1996) (supporting dual client model); Thomas D. Morgan & Charles
W. Wolfram, Lawyers Retained by Liability Carriers to Represent Insureds in the Restatement
of the Law Governing Lawyers, 6 COVERAGE 44 (Mar./Apr. 1996) (favoring view that insurer
is third-party fee payer, and attorney's sole client is insured).
11. See Carrier Express, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 860 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Ala. 1994).
12. Id. at 1482 (quoting trial transcript at 2217).
13. See id. (quoting trial transcript at 2230: "my first duty would be to the insured that I
am representing").
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duty was owed the insurer.14  Having answered the same question two
different ways but at least being consistent on the point that he owed duties to
the insured, he was then asked how he justified failing to communicate to the
insurer the insured's demand that the insurer settle the case within policy
limits. He responded, and one can imagine his distress as the difficulties of his
predicament became more apparent, "No, my client was [the insurer], who I
was being paid, but my client was [the insured] and I--that is not my job. I
made my recommendation and that is all I did."' 5 When asked whether the
insurer was his client in the underlying action, he said, "Obviously, I
represented, I was paid by [the insurer]. But I represented-my first duty was
to [the insured] .... ,16 The court concluded that the attorney's "confusion
about his role was apparent from his testimony in the case at bar."' 7 The jury
awarded the insured $2.46 million in compensatory damages and $4.81 million
in punitive damages, awards which were not altered by the judge when ruling
on post-trial motions.18 If Alabama's law (the applicable law in the foregoing
case) regarding defense counsel's responsibilities were clear, perhaps the
attorney should have been grateful that the court described him only as
"confused."'19 But the wide range of opinion on the correct answers in this area
caution against being too critical of any defense attorney who finds himself or
herself caught in the mire. This, of course, provides little comfort to the
attorney who is actually stuck in it.
If lawyers encounter difficulty in sorting through the relevant rules, it is
plainly inapt to expect lay policyholders to have much sense about the nature
of the insurer's obligations under a standard liability insurance contract. More
will be said on this subject in Part 11,20 but the essence of the issue is captured
by an advertisement which ran on national television networks in 1996 on
behalf of a large insurance company. The advertisement was noteworthy in its
focus on the insurer's duty to defend, as distinguished from the insurer's duty
14. See id. (quoting trial transcript at 2266-67).
15. Id. (quoting trial transcript at 2267-68).
16. Id. (quoting trial transcript at 2267-68).
17. Id.
18. See id. at 1486, 1487.
19. In L&S Roofing Supply Co., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 521 So. 2d
1298 (Ala. 1987), the Alabama Supreme Court held that when the insurer defends the insured
under a reservation of rights, "RPC [Rules of Professional Conduct] 5.4(c) demand that counsel
understand that he or she represents only the insured, not the company." Id. at 1303. The
defense counsel in the Carrier Express litigation "testified that he was unaware of the
reservation of rights until his deposition was taken in the case at bar even though a copy of the
reservation of rights letter was in his case file." 860 F. Supp. at 1469.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 43-65.
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to indemnify.2' The opening image is of a middle-aged man standing on what
appears to be a multi-lane divided highway, with vehicular wreckage all around
him. The figure is dressed in a business suit, but his tie is loose around the
neck of his white business shirt, and he is obviously fretful and concerned.
The scene implies that he alone is responsible or at least allegedly responsible
for all of the damage around him. The narrator begins with bad news: "You
are about to be sued by thirty-two people." As this message is conveyed, two
more collisions are heard in the background, implying that the number of
lawsuits needs to be recalculated. The good news follows: "[Insurer] defends
over fifty thousand [or some large number] lawsuits against its customers every
year," the implication being that the fretful figure, if he is a policyholder, can
take comfort in the security provided by the insurer.
22
In all likelihood, 3 the foregoing is about all the typical insured will
understand about the insurer's obligations under the defense insurance policy.
There is much that the insured will not understand, and there is much that the
advertisement does not say. The advertisement does not communicate that if
the first two of the thirty-four anticipated claims result in a good faith
settlement or judgment that exhausts the policy limits, the insurer's duty to
2 1. The author and others with whom he has spoken cannot recollect another insurance
company television advertisement for the general public's consumption which focuses on the
insurer's defense obligation. There may, however, have been some others in times past. Also,
the author has been unable to secure a copy of the advertisement (either videotape or text), thus
his summary of the advertisement may be erroneous in some respects.
22. Professor Ellen Smith Pryor aptly suggests that the use of a middle-aged, implicitly
middle-income professional is intended to encourage this kind of mainstream customer to
reexamine his or her policy to ascertain whether sufficiently high limits have been purchased.
Clearly, the advertisement is directed at litigation-averse individuals who, because of their
knowledge of what litigation entails and what it can cost, may be predisposed to purchase
additional coverage. This more subtle subplot has a substantial free-rider dimension, in that
it encourages insureds with other companies to check the adequacy of their policies, which says
little or nothing about the wisdom of switching companies. While the advertisement has
subtexts, its dominant message is that the insured is (or would be) well protected by this
particular insurer's good hands, even in the face of the catastrophe he has encountered.
23. This paper, like many others, infers what policyholders expect without offering solid
empirical support. This is a weakness in many analyses of insurance coverage issues. Although
the assertion in the text is probably a good description of what most policyholders understand,
it is appropriate to be skeptical of such assertions. For my part, I did walk into the office of an
agent for the insurer that provides my personal insurance. After explaining my purpose to
"Wanda," I asked, "If I get into an auto accident and the insurer decides to defend an eventual
lawsuit filed against me, whom will the attorney appointed by the insurer represent--me alone,
or the insurer and me?" Wanda, perhaps puzzled by my visit as much as anything, answered,
"I have no idea. That's a legal question, and we don't get into those." Generalizing about the
understanding of this (and other insurers') agents is risky, but I suggest that Wanda's answer
is typical of what most agents and brokers would say if presented with the same question.
Whatever agents and brokers comprehend about the issue, lay policyholders understand less.
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defend will be at an end.24 The advertisement does not communicate that the
insurer may claim the right to control the lawsuit and to make strategic
decisions about the conduct of the defense without obtaining the insured's
approval. 25 The advertisement does not communicate that the insurer may act
to protect only the insured's economic interests, and that the insurer in
conducting the litigation might disregard any of the insured's reputational or
other non-economic interests. 26 Although the policy is clear about the insurer's
retained discretion to settle claims against the insured without the insured's
consent, the advertisement does not communicate this important limitation on
the insurer's obligations to the insured. If the advertisement tells little about
the insurer's obligations to the insured, it tells even less about the role that the
attorney will play in carrying out the insurer's obligations.
24. See, e.g., Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1994); Pareti v.
Sentry Indem. Co., 536 So. 2d 417 (La. 1988); Gibson v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 456
S.E.2d 248 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); Levier v. Koppenheffer, 879 P.2d 40 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994).
The upshot of these cases is that the insurer can make good faith settlements of some claims
even if this exhausts the policy limits and leaves the insured personally responsible for the
remaining claims. If, however, the insurer enters into settlements for the purpose of exhausting
the policy limits so that the insurer can avoid defending and indemnifying the insured on other
claims, the insurer is not acting in good faith and may be held liable for damages caused the
insured.
25. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 10, at 265 ("For the last century, these common
[liability] insurance arrangements have permitted the company ... to supervise counsel's
litigation and settlement strategy, and to settle claims within policy limits at the company's
discretion").
26. See, e.g., Western Polymer Tech., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 78 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995); Arana v. Koemer, 735 S.W.2d 729, 735 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). These cases are
to be distinguished from those holding that the insurer has no duty to defend because an alleged
reputational harm is not an injury within the coverage of the policy and there is no separate
allegation of bodily injury or property damage. See, e.g., Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc., 900
P.2d 619 (Cal. 1995); Reams v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins., 683 A.2d 179, 187 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1996). Even if the insurer can disregard reputational interests in formulating defense and
settlement strategy, this rule must have some limits. The logic of the general principle--that an
insurer can enter into a good-faith settlement within policy limits without the insured's consent,
even against the insured's contention that settling rather than defending hurts the insured's
reputation--is that the settlement reduces the insured's exposure to covered financial risks
(whereas damage to reputational interests are not covered), even as it promotes the insurer's
interest (which is shared by all insureds) in minimizing total claims expenses, including defense
costs. Suppose, however, that plaintiff and insurer agree to settle a claim against the insured
for $X, but the plaintiff offers thereafter to accept a sum less than $X if the insurer will agree
to a non-confidential settlement document that contains language "testifying" to the insured's
negligence in ways that disparage the insured's reputation. The cheaper settlement would
further the insurer's claims-cost minimization objectives, but surely such an arrangement would
run afoul of the insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing. Once one enters this territory, the
insurer's ability to ignore the reputational interests of its insureds becomes less than absolute.
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It would be highly unrealistic, of course, to expect an advertisement to
convey much, if any, information about the coverage of a liability insurance
contract or to explore any of the knotty details of an insurer's obligations to
policyholders. The point is that information such as that provided in the
advertisement, or a similar communication, often is both the beginning and the
end of the consumer's understanding of his or her coverage. The bounds of
this understanding do not, of course, define the bounds of the insurer's
obligations of defense and indemnity, but what the insurer knows or has reason
to know about the shape of the insured's expectations pours meaning into the
language of the insurance contract. This, in turn, pours meaning into what
policyholders are likely to expect of an attorney appointed by the insurer to
protect the insured's interests when a claim within coverage is filed against him
or her. This is given more attention in Part II.
UI. INSURANCE POLICY TEXT AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS
A. Some First Things About "Consent"
"Consent" is a word of no small moment in the Anglo-American legal
tradition.27 In the law of promissory relationships, "consent" is the anchor for
many of the principles that define and regulate those relationships. In this
important usage, "consent" refers to the voluntary acquiescence, assent,
compliance, approval, or agreement with what someone else proposes to do.28
27. Democratic theory utilizes "consent" to anchor the principle under which people
organize a society and grant to a government the authority to regulate the behavior of
individuals within that society. This finds its early expression in the writings of John Locke, the
U.S. Declaration of Independence, and the Federalist Papers, to name a few prominent
examples. Consistently with the basic premise, many of the principles which order that society
and define the bounds between acceptable and intolerable conduct depend on the existence of
"consent" for their application. See, e.g., Pan Eastern Exploration Co. v. Hufo Oils, 855 F.2d
1106, 1121 (5th Cir. 1988) (conversion is defined as "taking without consent"); Rawls v.
Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 446 F.2d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1971) (with regard to defense of
consent in tort, "one may not complain of acts to which he had consented," quoting HARPER &
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 1. 11, at 38 (1956)); Shedd v. Lamb, 553 N.W.2d 241 (S.D. 1996)
(consent of parties is necessary for formation of contract). In these usages and many others,
consent is the essential first step to the creation of authority to act. This is the proper order of
things in a society that readily concedes the importance of cooperative enterprises, but gives
priority in a great many situations to a person's desire to remain a unilateral actor unless he or
she "consents" to some joint or cooperative relationship.
28. These terms conflate the various ideas in various dictionaries. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 482 (1993); THE OXFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 760-
61 (2d ed. 1989); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 305 (6th ed. 1990). Much more can, of course,
be said about the meaning of "consent" in this context. Consent presupposes that one has the
capacity to give it. See Reavis v. Slominski, 551 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Neb. 1996) ("[C]onsent
[Vol. 4:1
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Consent is also the anchor for the creation of attorney-client relationships, and
in this context consent has a meaning that is essentially identical to that which
it enjoys in the law of promissory relationships.
How does defense counsel acquire a client? The general rule is that a
lawyer-client relationship arises when "a person manifests to a lawyer the
person's intent that the lawyer provide legal services for the person" and "the
lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so.,,29 In the absence of the
lawyer's manifestation of consent, the lawyer-client relationship is established
"if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person reasonably
relies on the lawyer to provide the services. '30 The insurer that appoints
defense counsel does not automatically become a client of the attorney
appointed to defend the insured; indeed, it may be that the insurer will prefer
to carry out its obligations to the insured under the liability insurance contract
by assuming the posture of a third-party payor of the expenses of an attorney
retained for the purpose of representing only the insured.3' Sometimes, then,
the insurer and attorney will explicitly agree that the insurer is or is not the
attorney's client. In the absence of an agreement, the possibility looms that the
is ineffective if the person lacks capacity to consent to the conduct."); Wythe v. Blair, 885 P.2d
791, 794 (Utah 1994); ([C]onsenting parties must show ... capacity to give consent."). See
Shedd v. Lamb, 553 N.W.2d 241,244 (S.D. 1996) (with regard to contract formation, "Consent
is not real or free if obtained through fraud, undue influence, or mistake."); Hazel v. State, 157
A.2d 922, 925 (Md. 1960) ([S]ubmission to a compelling force, or as a result of being put in
fear, is not consent."). All of this points toward a conscious, knowing understanding of what
one is doing when one consents. See e.g., Stewart v. Pantry, Inc. 715 F. Supp. 1361, 1368
(W.D. Ky. 1988) ([N]o facts exist from which it can be inferred that the plaintiffs did not
voluntarily and knowingly consent to [polygraph tests]."). Consent can be implied, however,
from circumstances. See, e.g., Rawls v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 446 F.2d 313, 315 (5th
Cir. 1971) ("Consent may be implied from custon, local or general, from usage or from the
conduct ot the parties, or some relationship between them." (quoting HARPER & JAMES, supra
note 28, § 1. 11, at 38); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Dearborn Title Corp., 904 F. Supp. 818, 821
n.2 (N.D. 11. 1995) ("[C]onsent may be implied by silence where a reasonable person would
speak if objecting.").
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, Mar. 29, 1996) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Section 26 also provides that the
relationship can be formed without the lawyer's manifested consent if "a tribunal with power
to do so appoints the lawyer to provide the services."
30. Id.
31. This is precisely what the "Proposed Movants'-Reporters' Text on Liability-Insurance
Issues," states in proposed comment f to section 215 of the Restatement. See also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, §26, cmt. i ("Duties may be owed to a liability insurance
company that designates a lawyer to represent the insured even if the insurer is not a client of
the lawyer .. "). Florida State Bar Assoc. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 81-5
(1981) ("The insurer may choose to proceed by employment of counsel for the insured alone,
and separate counsel for the insurer, or by employment of counsel jointly for the insurer and
insured").
1997]
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insurer is relying on the attorney to provide representation for the insurer, and
because the attorney should reasonably (or may actually) know this, the
attorney will have the insurer as a client.
32
As Professors Silver and Syverud observe in their important 1995 article
in the Duke Law Journal33 where they sought to clarify the state of things for
insurance defense counsel, how the insured comes to be the attorney's client
is not so simple.34 In the usual case, the insured upon receipt of service of
process will forward the service, the complaint, and other suit papers to the
insurer and ask the insurer to undertake the defense, a request which can
reasonably be construed as including a request that the insurer appoint a lawyer
to represent the insured.35 But as Silver and Syverud state, again correctly, the
fact of the insured's consent to representation by defense counsel at the time
the defense is requested "is too weak to show that the insured consents to joint
representation by demanding a defense."
36
The importance of the question of consent to joint representation is
apparent when one isolates the role that consent plays in the broader thesis
advanced by Professors Silver and Syverud. They conclude that with respect
to within-limits claims where coverage is not disputed,37 defense counsel (if the
insurer so chooses) has an attorney-client relationship with both the insurer and
the insured,38 and that the liability insurance contract, the terms of which
"bleed" into the retainer agreement between insurer and defense counsel, 39 can
severely constrain defense counsel's obligations to the insured.40 The second
part of the Silver-Syverud thesis depends on the validity of the first. If the
32. This raises some interesting possibilities in jurisdictions where the governing rules
insist that the attorney represent only the insured. Is it reasonable to presume that the insurer
knows of such rules? Should such knowledge be imputed to the insurer? If those questions are
answered in the negative, does the attorney who fails at the time of appointment to explain the
situation to the insurer find himself or herself in an attorney-client relationship with the insurer
in violation of the jurisdiction's applicable law? The case discussed in the introduction, Carrier
Express, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 860 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Ala. 1994), gives one possible
answer: "counsel beware."
33. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 10, at 255.
34. See id. at 280.
35. See id. at 280-82.
36. Id. at 284.
37. See id. at 263. These are important limiting assumptions, and will receive more
attention later in this piece. See infra note 117.
38. See id. at 273.
39. See id. at 271-73.
40. This conclusion (and the word "severely" is their own) appears at the end of the Silver
& Syverud article. However, the bulk of the article is devoted to articulating the argument in
favor of this conclusion, as well as illustrating the operation of the framework in a variety
situations.
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first part of the argument is incorrect, i.e., if defense counsel's only client is the
insured, the default rules of agency law and professional responsibility law
govern counsel's obligations to the insured. It would be highly inapt to suggest
that the liability insurance policy, which exists as a bilateral contract between
insurer and insured, is irrelevant; after all, the policy creates the insurer's
defense obligation and outlines what the insurer must do to fulfill that
obligation. But the policy, to which counsel is not a contracting party, does not
by virtue of its mere existence "bleed" into the retainer agreement between
insurer and counsel and does not, whether through "bleeding" or otherwise,
limit the obligations that counsel owes the insured.4' Instead, the entirety of
the argument that defense counsel's obligations to the insured are constrained
hinges on the existence of the insured's consent to joint representation.
Silver and Syverud purport to find the insured's consent to joint
representation in the liability insurance contract and, more specifically, in the
insurer's widely-recognized right to control the defense:
The company is entitled to control the defense. The company
expects to take the helm and can defend the liability suit
effectively only if it is a co-client. In contrast, the insured has
no right of control, and, in a full coverage case, has no
reasonable expectation of asserting control (and perhaps no
actual expectation as well). In these circumstances, it is
proper to conclude that the insured, by demanding a defense,
impliedly agrees to allow the company to become a co-
client.42
Here, then, is an indispensable and fundamental premise upon which the
structure of the joint representation paradigm is erected: the insurer has a right
41. It may be that the insurer will appoint the attorney to provide a narrower range of
services to the insured, and that this limited engagement will reflect the insurer's view that the
liability insurance contract obligates the insurer to provide a narrower range of services. The
policyholder will consent to and accept the appointment if the policyholder is satisfied that the
proposed representation fulfills the insurer's obligations. If the policyholder believes
otherwise, the policyholder may decline the appointment. However, this is not an issue for
defense counsel. Rather, the issue is for insured and insurer to determine, i.e., what must be
done by the insurer to discharge the insurer's contract obligations owed to the insured.
42. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 10, at 284-85. ("It is our judgment that an insured
who demands a defense thereby consents both to representation by company-selected counsel
and to joint representation because of the context in which the demand is presented.")
(emphasis added). Id. at 284. See also id. at 288 ("Thus far, we have shown that ...
relationships with both clients arise at the time the company retains counsel for the insured.")
(emphasis added).
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to control the defense, and the insured does not; the insured has no reasonable
or actual expectation of a right of control, and the insurer does; therefore, the
insured consents to joint representation. Much is missing from this argument.
As discussed shortly, the so-called "right of control" is more murky than
commonly supposed. The insured's expectations, if he or she has any, are
more complex than the Silver-Syverud argument credits; and in the absence
of actual expectations, what expectations the insured might reasonably have
is another matter altogether. Unlike Silver and Syverud and contrary to the
recent writings of William Barker,43 I believe there are reasons that insureds,
at the time of contracting, do not expect the insurer to enjoy the status of a co-
client if it becomes necessary for the insurer to appoint defense counsel to
represent the insured.
B. Interpreting Insurance Contracts
Before turning to the texts of the widely-used liability insurance forms, it
is useful to consider the context in which liability insurance contracts are
marketed to and purchased by insurance consumers. But before examining
either text or context, the standards which guide this assessment must be
sketched.
Generalizing about insurance contract interpretation in a brief space is
difficult, and other sources provide a fuller description of the intricacies of the
interpretive process.44 Insurance policies are contracts,45 and the core principle
is that the words of a contract are to be given the meaning that the parties
intended. There is little disagreement about this basic point,46 even if the
43. See William T. Barker, The Tripartite Relationship and Protection of the Insured:
Beyond Professional Responsibility, 18 INS. LIT. RPTR. 528 (Oct. 1996) ("As an original
proposition, it would seem strange to think that the insurer would not be a client.") (emphasis
in original).
44. For more discussion, see generally JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF
INSURANCE CONTRACTS (1994); 2 ERIC M. HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, HOLMES' APPLEMAN
ON INSURANCE, 2D §§ 5.1-9.8 (1996); ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW
§ 25A (2d ed. 1996); Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95
MICH. L. REV. 531 (1996); Peter Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Insurance Contract
Disputes: Toward a Realistic Middle Ground Approach, 57 OHO ST. L.J. 543 (1996); James
M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?, 24 ARIz.
ST. L.J 995 (1992).
45. See STEMPEL, supra note 45, at 296 ("[T]he insurance policy remains a species of
contract. Contract law, as modified over the years in the insurance context, is the starting point
for analysis of coverage issues by both claims departments and courts... mhe current hybrid
of basic contract law infused with a number of largely pro-policyholder modifications continues
to dominate policy coverage questions").
46. Professor Arthur Corbin offered the classic explanation of interpretation: "[I]t is
certain that the purpose of the court is in all cases the ascertainment of the 'intention of the
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apparent simplicity of the observation disguises some rather subtle, and
important, difficulties.47 Although some courts, Professor Williston, and others
have encouraged the notion that language has an objective or "plain" meaning
apart from the parties' intention,48 resort to a "plain meaning" approach to
interpretation normally produces results in accord with the parties' intentions
at the time of contracting, given that most people during contract-formation
communications use words consistently with their customary or usual meaning.
If a contracting party uses a word that has a customary meaning shared by
parties' if they had one in common." I ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 106 (1963). Professor
Williston's premise is virtually identical: "In the case of contracts, the avowed purpose and
primary function of the court is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties."; 4 SAMUEL
J. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 601, at 303-04 (3d ed. 1961). See also HOLMES &
RHODES, supra note 44, § 5.1 at 4 ("Under the classical method, a court's function is to
determine the parties' law through the judicial process of interpretation of the 'meaning' the
parties intended.").
47. Because what a party subjectively intends is often impossible to know and because
parties rely on what others externally manifest, a party's mental assent is not necessary to form
a contract, but parties will be bound to the objectively reasonable meanings of their external
manifestations. See G. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 118-20 (2d ed. 1990). The objective
view of assent compromises classical notions of consent, in that assent is based not on actual
consent, but on objective manifestations of it. If"assent" to a contract need not be actual, it is
a relatively short step to the observation that the content of contractual obligations should
depend less on assent and more on the relational aspects of the exchange. See also IAN R.
MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT, 47-50, 71-117 (1980); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational
Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854, 884 (1978) (using insurance contracts to illustrate
limitations of "neoclassical" objective theory). A rich literature developing relational contract
theory has emerged in the late twentieth century, but the idea that insurance is a "relation"
rather than a contract finds its expression in much earlier works. See ROSCOE POUND, THE
SPIRIT OFTHE COMMON LAW 15 (1921) ("[W]e have taken the law of insurance practically out
of the category of contract, and we have established that the duties of public service companies
are not contractual, as the nineteenth-century sought to make them, but are instead relational;
they do not flow from agreements which the public servant may make as he chooses, they flow
from the calling in which he has engaged and in his consequent relation to the public").
The extent to which relational theory should be used to adjust reciprocal rights and duties
of policyholders and insurers is an intriguing question, the exploration of which must await
another day. Insurance law, at least for now, is dominated by the traditional (i.e., classical or
neoclassical) model. As Professor Stempel has explained, "the current hybrid of basic contract
law infused with a number of largely pro-policyholder modifications continues to dominate
policy coverage questions. Insurance law may be different but it remains contract law, at least
in theory, rhetoric, and (for the most part) application." STEMPEL, supra note 45, at 296. See
also HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 44, § 5. I at 8 ("More often, however, policies of insurance
are traditionally treated much the same as other contracts; they are matters of agreement by the
parties. The task for the courts is to determine what the parties intended in that agreement and
enforce it accordingly"); Fischer, supra note 44, at 1002 ("The special rules governing
insurance contract interpretation build on the general rules applicable to all contracts.").
48. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, at 503-04, 522-28.
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most in the community, that party should understand that the recipients of the
communication will take the speaker's meaning to be in accord with that
customary, or "plain," meaning; if the speaker intends a different meaning, it
is the responsibility of the speaker to make that intention known.
The obvious difficulty is that parties to a contract have a proclivity to use
words without conferring about what the words mean. This is not to be
lamented, for expecting more from parties would cause a great many desirable
relationships never to come into existence; conferring over the meaning of
terms is very often economically counterproductive. This reality increases the
likelihood that parties will attach different meanings to their words, or that one
or both of the parties will not pay any particular attention to the words and may
have no particular understanding about the meaning of words at the time of
contracting. When a party is disappointed with the performance of a contract,
it may become convenient for that party to attach a different meaning to a
pivotal term or phrase than he or she possessed at the time of contracting, or
to articulate for the first time a meaning of the term which, even if articulated
in good faith, happens to coincide with benefits to be gained by that party if the
contract is interpreted in accordance with this "recently discovered" meaning.
A "plain language" approach to interpretation reduces the risk of strategic or
opportunistic re-interpretations of contract language that enable contracting
parties to reduce the losses that accompany what were, with the benefit of
hindsight, unwise exchanges. Thus, champions of this approach should be
understood (or interpreted) to mean not that words have an intrinsic meaning
apart from the parties' intention when they invoke words, but that "plain
meaning" normally accords with mutually intended meanings (or an objectively
reasonable intended meaning if the parties appeared to have no actual
intentions) held at the time of contracting.49
49. Even Professor Williston, the most important of all classical contract scholars, can be
read as concurring with the referenced proposition:
Thus, it has been said that many of the highest courts in this country
have decided that, when the meaning of words is not ambiguous, proof of
usage will not be received in the interpretation of contracts.
The accuracy of such statements cannot be admitted, but the cases
where they are made may generally be readily supported on the ground that
even if the proffered evidence were considered, the meaning of the contract
clearly still remained the meaning apparent from the normal meaning of the
words when unexplained by extrinsic evidence.
WILLISTON, supra note 46, § 609, at 412 (emphasis added). Other portions of his treatise,
however, point the other direction. See, e.g., id. §95 at 359 ("The court will give that language
[in a contract] its natural and appropriate meaning; and, if the words are unambiguous, will not
even admit evidence of what the parties may have thought the meaning to be").
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Just as scientists studying nuclear particles must be concerned about
whether their acts of observation are altering the substance of what they are
observing, judges must be concerned that their interpretive efforts will favor
a meaning that the parties did not intend. These efforts are complicated by the
mere fact that the judicial process is invoked simply because and only when the
parties give different meanings to contract language. This requires a court to
choose among the meanings offered by the parties or, in rare circumstances,
some other objective meaning if no party offers a reasonable one. The core
principle-determining what the parties intended at the time of contracting-
does not change, even if each party hopes to convince the court that its
proffered meaning best explains what the parties must have understood at the
time the contract was formed and even if the chasm between these proffered
meanings is large. It is in this context that appeals to a "plain" or "objective"
meaning of disputed language may occur; but the subtext of any such appeal
is that the only conclusion to be reasonably drawn in the circumstances is that
the parties' common understanding at the time of contracting was in
accordance with the language's "plain meaning."
In urging a court to prefer one meaning of disputed language to the
exclusion of another, one party (or both) may argue that the other contracting
party knew or had reason to know the meaning (whether or not a "plain" one)
attached by the first party, whereas the first party did not know or have reason
to know the meaning attached by the other party. In such circumstances, the
first party argues that its meaning controls, given that the other party
understood at the time of contracting the meaning attached to the disputed
language by the first party. 50 An appeal to "plain meaning" simplifies the
argument, but not the essential issue: the first party argues that the other party
knew or had reason to know the meaning attached to the term by the first party
simply because this meaning is a "plain" one; ergo, the other party knew or
should have known about the first party's "meaning," and the other party's
superior knowledge requires that the meaning favored by the first party
controls. 51
50. This framework is set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981).
Analogous rules apply to contract formation; if A knows that B means "cow #1" when A and
B contract for the sale of "B's cow," but B does not know or have reason to know that A
intends the contract to be for "cow #2," the contract is for the sale of "cow #1." See id. § 201.
51. Extending from the prior footnote: If A and B contract for the sale of a "horse" but A
and B both know that "horse" means A's cow in this instance, the plain meaning approach
would require the delivery of the horse. This seems odd, but if in fact both parties agree that
"horse" means "A's cow," A will deliver his cow and nothing more will be heard from the
parties, particularly in the presence of ajudge. If, however, B seeks delivery of the cow under
the foregoing contract and A opposes this, the plain meaning approach, as interpreted above,
is not so much an endorsement of the intrinsic meaning of the word "horse" as it is a statement
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The foregoing principles assume the presence of the give-and-take
associated with contracts formed through bargain and negotiation. The
widespread use of standardized form contracts in the twentieth century has put
pressure on many principles of classical contract law, including interpretation.
Standardization can become a cover for the imposition of unfair terms by
parties with disproportionate economic power, and a significant portion of the
policing jurisprudence in late twentieth-century contract law is aimed at
precisely that problem.5 2 It is common to refer to standardized contracts as
"adhesive," and on that account to give the benefit of all doubts to the "adhered
party," the recipient of the form, to the detriment of the party that drafted the
form.
"Standardization" thus becomes a proxy for a vision of the contracting
process that involves the imposition of terms by a stronger party upon the
weaker. Such a vision provides a nearly-automatic answer when disputes over
meaning arise in connection with a standardized form: naturally, the weaker
party, who has had the terms thrust upon him or her and is the functional
equivalent of the "shorn lamb driven to" slaughter,53 is the party that needs
protection; therefore, the drafter must lose. The flaw in this vision is that
standardization, in and of itself, does not prove that monopoly or oligopoly
power is being asserted against weaker parties. Suppliers in many highly
competitive markets use standardized forms to reduce costs, and insurance is
often used to illustrate the point.54
The more serious problem presented by standardization is the information
imbalance between a standardized form's provider (i.e., drafter) and the form's
recipient. The drafter of the standardized form is a repeat player with the
that allowing B to succeed in forcing the sale of the cow is, in all likelihood, trampling on the
parties' mutual understanding at the time of contracting-which was to sell A's horse because
the parties said "horse." The plain meaning approach endorses the simple, and reasonable,
point that most parties do not say "horse" when they mean "cow." Few cases are this simple,
however, and a broader assessment of the context in which the parties spoke their words is in
most situations more likely to get closer to the parties' intended meaning at the time of
contracting.
52. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,448-49 (D.C. Cir.
1965); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 94-95 (N.J. 1960); Jones v. Star
Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969); Parton v. Mark Pirtle Oldsmobile-
Cadillac-Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 634, 637-38 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
53. The metaphor, interestingly enough, is Professor Williston's. See 7 WILLISTON, supra
note 47, § 900, at 19-20.
54. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 119 (1993);
Fischer, supra note 45, at 1013 ("Insofar as the scope of coverage is concerned, the issue is not
so much disparity in bargaining power, as lack of information available to the insured, which
disables him from fully assessing his insurance needs"); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HART. L. REv. 1173, 1205 (1983).
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expertise that comes from familiarity with the transaction; the recipient of the
form, a one-shot or few-shot player, is at the other end of the spectrum. The
drafter typically benefits from expert legal advice, which may not be available
to the form's recipient.55 The recipient of the form is not expected and may not
even have the opportunity to read the form, let alone scrutinize it; and the
recipient may lack even the basic skills needed to understand the form's
content, even if the recipient were encouraged to read it. Indeed, in most
situations the recipient of the standardized writing has no particular desire "to
understand or even read the standard terms." 56 These circumstances render
classical contract rules pertaining to contract formation and interpretation less
meaningful,57 but courts have for the most part held onto the classical
framework while acknowledging the need for and implementing more
aggressive policing of exchanges under standardized forms.
58
Under the classical framework, one who signs a contract without reading
it--even if the contract is a standardized form--may well be held bound to its
terms. There is, however, considerable authority recoiling from that position.59
If reading and understanding a proposed form would be irrelevant due to the
absence of an opportunity to bargain over terms,60 it is counter-intuitive to
penalize non-readers of forms; encouraging more reading and greater
awareness of the content of the forms would, in the best of circumstances,
change nothing. Even if one takes a classical view and gives great weight to
whether a contracting party has read and understood the terms to which he or
she is assenting, the fact that the insured lacks an actual expectation about the
meaning of words in a standardized form-even if this understanding is
accompanied by failing to read and to attempt to understand the form--does
not allow the words to mean whatever the insurer wishes.
In one sense, the flexibility displayed by some courts in excusing parties
from the full measure of standardized contracts they signed or adopted but
never read or attempted to understand is a logical extension of classical
contract doctrine. Drafters of standardized forms know or have reason to know
that the recipients of the forms will have considerably less understanding of the
55. The imbalance in expertise was noted by Professor Williston. See WILLISTON, supra
note 46.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1981).
57. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 54, at 119 ("to hold parties bound to standard form
contracts which they had entered into but which they had not read or understood does not rest
comfortably with a theory of contractual obligation premised on individual autonomy and
consent. Clearly, in many, perhaps most cases, meaningful consent is absent").
58. For a more detailed discussion, see STEMPEL, supra note 45, §§ 3.5, 10.1-10.4, at 97-
107, 283-96.
59. See JERRY, supra note 44, § 32(b), at 182-84.
60. See Rakoff, supra note 54, at 1180-83.
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terms of the contract (and the recipient will not know, or have reason to know,
the meanings attached by the drafter to particular terms or provisions); this
implies that specialized meanings favored by drafters will not trump
objectively reasonable understandings held by the recipients of the form, and
instead may be trumped by the inferred reasonable understanding that the
insured would have if he or she had considered the matter at all--which, of
course, probably never occurred. The foregoing observation leads one to the
brink of embracing the doctrine of reasonable expectations 61 or the pro-
consumer standard in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 21 1.62 But one
need not go that far. Whether one chooses to embrace doctrines that rewrite
contract language or discard terms that cause unfair surprise, one basic point
cannot be escaped (unless one is prepared to jettison the idea that consent, or
at least the objective manifestations of consent, is needed to form a contract):
modem contract law requires, quite simply, that anyone who presents a
standardized form to a less knowledgeable recipient must make the language
of the contract reasonably understandable.63 This is a hurdle over which the
61. As approved by many courts, the doctrine of reasonable expectations holds that the
insured's objectively reasonable expectations will be upheld even though a painstaking analysis
of the policy's provisions would have resulted in a denial of coverage. For more discussion of
the doctrine of reasonable expectations, see generally Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 823 (1990);
JERRY, supra note 44, § 25D, at 141-47.
62. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts cuts a significant path through the plain-
meaning forest by suggesting that courts sometimes disregard even clear terms in a standardized
writing. Section 211(3) provides:
Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such
assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular
term, the term is not part of the agreement.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).
Comment (f) to the section elaborates:
Although customers typically adhere to standardized agreements and are
bound by them without even appearing to know the standard terms in
detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range
of reasonable expectation .... [A] party who adheres to the other party's
standard terms does not assent to a term if the other party has reason to
believe that the adhering party would not have accepted the agreement if
he had known that the agreement contained the particular term.
Id. at cmt. f.
Few courts have explicitly approved the formulation suggested in Section 211; for a
notable case to the contrary, see Rawlings v. Apadoca, 726 P.2d 565 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc).
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drafter must jump; there is some uncertainty about the height at which the
hurdle will be set in any particular situation, but failing to exceed it will
produce outcomes that favor the recipient and go against the drafter.
64
All of this may appear to place a difficult burden on the drafter of a
standardized form who wishes to limit the insurer's responsibilities, but the
drafter's position is hardly hopeless. In this framework, if the insurer cares
deeply about a particular term, the principles contemplate that the insurer
clearly manifest its expectation about the term to the insured so that the insured
is not later subjected to unfair surprise. Clear drafting of contract language can
go a long way down this road, but even clear drafting does not guarantee that
the insurer can make its term binding. If a term is so disadvantageous to the
insured that it might be found to be "beyond the range of reasonable
expectation," the insurer must bring the term and the insurer's understanding
of it to the insured's attention in a manner sufficient to cause the insured to
expect the term, even if the insured acquires no actual knowledge of the term
because he or she is not paying attention to what the insurer is attempting to
communicate.
C. The Context of Liability Insurance Contracting
Contextual factors of considerable force place any contract term pursuant
to which defense counsel's loyalties are divided between insured and insurer
outside the range of the insured's expectations.65 Initially, it must be conceded
that the actual expectations of insureds with respect to the obligations of
insurers lack specificity and detail. Insureds rarely read their policies until they
have a reason to do so, and even then are unlikely to understand much of what
they read. I submit that relatively few insureds realize, for example, that their
homeowners insurance provides general liability protection; most insureds
believe a homeowners policy provides coverage for the structure of the insured
residence and its contents. These insureds are far from understanding the
general parameters, let alone the nuances, of the insurer's defense obligations.
Insureds probably understand that their automobile policies have a liability
63. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS
413-14 (5th ed. 1995) ("Presenting a standard form contract to a consumer for assent entails
a certain obligation to make it intelligible. This general proposition, though not yet fully
defined, is exemplified by widespread decisions, statutes, and regulations, quite various in
detail.").
64. In his 1996 article on interpretation of insurance contracts, Professor Abraham
articulates and describes the various standards courts have approved in their application of the
doctrine of contra proferentum; some of the standards are stricter than others, and by necessity
produce different outcomes in similar cases. See generally Abraham, supra note 44, at 537-56.
65. 1 concede that it would be interesting to test this proposition empirically, but I believe
that the results of such a test would confirm these assumptions.
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coverage component; in most states, liability insurance is compulsory, insureds
are reminded of this when they seek to obtain license plates or a drivers license,
and most people are probably attuned to the risk of automobile transportation
and the attendant liability exposures. Yet even here, most insureds probably
view the liability exposure as the risk of a bankrupting civil judgment, and thus
think of the insurance protection largely in terms of indemnity.66  The
exposures associated with the expenses of defending against claims for such
judgments are probably secondary in most insureds' range of expectation, if
they have any expectation at all about the process through which such
judgments are obtained.
It is fair to suggest that insureds in recent years have become more aware
of the importance of the defense obligation in liability insurance policies. Some
of this has resulted from widely-publicized contentions that civil litigation is
both excessive and too expensive, a belief that has been encouraged by some
insurers. Yet even if insureds when purchasing liability insurance desire to
obtain protection against two distinct risks of loss, namely, the risk of having
to pay money to a plaintiff who succeeds in securing a judgment against the
insured, and the risk of incurring expenses in defending against that claim, the
typical insured probably views the expense of defending the plaintiff's claim
primarily in terms of the cost of retaining and paying for a lawyer. This
suggests that the insured understands the solution provided by the insurer to be
this: "To save you the expense of retaining a lawyer, we will take care of that
problem by retaining the lawyer for you and paying the lawyer's fee." Thus,
from the insured's perspective, the insurer is simply the "Uncle Joe" who
66. Professor Widiss may disagree with this assessment of insureds' comprehension of the
content of their policies. In a 1990 article, he wrote:
The practice of undertaking the defense when a claim is made or a suit is
filed against an insured is undoubtedly widely known to the public.
Consequently, purchasers have come to expect that liability insurers
provide insureds with defenses to tort suits, as well as with indemnification
(up to the limits of the liability) for any judgment or settlement.
Alan I. Widiss, Abrogating the Right and Duty of Liability Insurers to Defend their Insureds:
The Case for Separating the Obligation to Indemnify from the Defense of Insureds, 51 OHIO
ST. L.J. 917, 918 (1990). Anyone who has been sued once, or has a friend who has been sued
once, for alleged tortious conduct probably understands the essential aspects of the indemnity-
defense distinction. Perhaps this group is now large enough that.Professor Widiss is correct.
My sense is that most second- or third-year law students at the beginning of the basic insurance
law course do not understand the distinction or even the basics of the coverage (although they
are quick to grasp it once encountering it), and this leads me to think that the general public
probably understands very little about it either. As the subsequent text explains, however,
whether Professor Widiss' or my assessment is more accurate does not matter much.
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comes to the rescue when the unlucky and relatively resourceless nephew finds
himself in need of legal help but without either the expertise or financial means
to take care of this matter directly. From this perspective, the insurer is the
benefactor who takes care of the insured's problem with the same detachment
that the insurer pays the proceeds to substitute for the damage to the insured's
house when it is damaged by a falling tree. The first-party insurer has an
economic stake in minimizing the proceeds to be paid and otherwise reducing
claims-processing expenses, but if the loss is covered, the insurer protects those
interests through a substitute for the entirety of a within-limits loss. The
expectations of the insured in the third-party setting are unlikely to be much
different; the insured probably expects that his or her interests will be fully
protected, assuming both that the interests are within the coverage and that the
insured complies with relevant conditions of the policy relevant to claims
processing. In effect, the insured, lacking a reliable or sufficiently wealthy
"Uncle Joe," views his or her premium as purchasing the equivalent of a
benevolent uncle whose relationship to the insured is for all practical purposes
the third-party payor of the insured's defense expenses.
This assumption, just like the contrary one made by Silver and Syverud in
their article, is likely to be controversial,67 and it is important to understand that
the assumption has limits. Plainly, it is not reasonable for an insured to assume
that the insurer is obligated to do for the insured whatever the insured wants.
Indeed, as generous as uncles can be, they are not servants. But an
expectation that defense counsel has undivided loyalty to the insured is not one
that the insured is likely to form entirely on his or her own; rather, the insurer
or its agents are likely to play some role in creating this expectation. It is, of
course, dangerous to generalize about the quality and quantity of information
brokers or agents provide to applicants at the point where insurance policies are
marketed and sold, but it is safe to assert that the quality and quantity of
information shared is uneven. In my own experience, the agent or broker
selling liability insurance affirms that if the insured is sued, the insurer "will
take care of it" for the insured; the message to the insured is that the insured,
who is likely to have had little, if any, contact with the legal system and may
not even be acquainted with an attorney, will not have to search for and select
his or her own attorney. For one unacquainted with lawyers generally and with
the specifics of how one goes about finding a lawyer well-suited for the task
at hand, the insurer's promise to do this for the insured (i.e., "we will get you
an attorney") is a promise of a valuable service. The important point is that the
67. My invocation of Silver and Syverud's language is deliberate, for this is the crux of
the debate. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 10, at 273 ("This [assumption that "the agreement
under which defense counsel is retained creates two attorney-client relationships"] is a
controversial assumption").
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insured can leave his or her conversation with the broker or agent reasonably
expecting that the insurer's promise to defend any future claim is a promise to
secure for the insured an attorney whose relationship to the insured will be the
same as if the insured had retained the attorney directly. Many courts have
conceptualized the content of the liability insurance contract in exactly this
way.
68
D. The Substance of the Liability Insurance Contract
Under the interpretive approaches followed by some courts, clear contract
language does not necessarily defeat reasonable expectations. 69  But the
analysis cannot end here, because for some courts unambiguous contract
language trumps--or, more accurately, prevents inquiry into-whatever
expectations the insured has about the insurer's promises. 70 Thus, it is
necessary to inquire into the language of the liability insurance contract,
looking for text that, if read and understood, would dispel the expectation that
the preceding section suggested most insureds bring to the liability insurance
contract.
Among Silver and Syverud's working hypotheses is a concise articulation
of the content of typical liability insurance contracts:
[T]he vast majority of policies give the insurance company the
right to defend the case, and require the cooperation of the
insured in the company's defense of any suits. For the last
century, these common insurance arrangements have
permitted the company to select counsel to defend an action,
to supervise counsel's litigation and settlement strategy, and
to settle claims within policy limits at the company's
discretion.7'
The quoted passage states the commonly-expressed wisdom on insurers' rights
and privileges as well as insureds' obligations. In footnote 26 to the quoted
passage, Silver and Syverud articulate a summary of the foregoing paragraph
68. See, e.g., Mirchum v. Hudgens, 533 So. 2d 194, 199 (Ala. 1988); Palermo v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 676 N.E.2d 1158, 1164 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997); Illinois Masonic
Med. Ctr. v. Turegum Ins. Co., 522 N.E.2d 611, 613 (111. App. Ct. 1988).
69. See Henderson, supra note 6 1, at 827-28 (observing that at least 16 jurisdictions have
approved the application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations without regard to the
presence of ambiguous language in the insurance contract).
70. See, e.g., Alfv. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1993); American
Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Elliot, 523 N.W.2d 100 (S.D. 1994); Robbins Auto Parts, Inc. v.
Granite State Ins. Co., 435 A.2d 507, 509 (N.H. 1981); JERRY, supra note 44, § 25D, at 144.
71. Silver & Syverud, supra note 10, at 264-65.
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that appears to have near-universal acceptance as well: that the forms in
common use today "entitle the company to control the defense., 72 Moreover,
Silver and Syverud's observation accurately reflects the assessment of most
courts that have decided to say something about the insurer's rigfhts. 73 Silver
and Syverud, like most who assert the foregoing conclusion, cite to but do not
parse the text of these forms, probably assuming (as many do) that the matter
is settled. But because the dual client argument ultimately depends on the
existence of the insurer's right to control the defense, it is worth revisiting this
fundamental question, and asking whether the texts of these forms
unequivocally communicate this meaning to the reasonable reader. I conclude
that it is far from clear that the language of the standard forms conveys to the
reasonable reader that the insurer reserves unto itself a right to control the
defense.
That the standard language defining the insurer's defense obligations
under most liability policies is indefinite in many respects is not a new
observation. Professor Abraham stated in his important 1986 book74 that
Liability insurance policies often create obligations that are
insufficiently detailed to govern insurer conduct completely.
They appear to grant the insurer the privilege to settle claims
but impose no obligation to do so, and they create a duty to
defend the insured without specifying its breadth or limits. 75
He made the same point with respect to whether the duty to defend is triggered
at all in situations where the insurer's coverage responsibility is in doubt,
observing that "[t]he language of the standard liability policy provides almost
no guidance., 76 Professor Morris argued in an early article on the subject that
72. Silver & Syverud, supra note 10, at 265 n.26.
73. See, e.g., Merchants Indem. Corp. v. Eggleston, 179 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1962); American
Cas. Co. v. Timmons, 352 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1965); Duke v. Hoch, 468 F.2d 973 (5th Cir.
1972), motion denied, Duke v. Hoch, 475 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1972); Vandivort Constr. Co. v.
Seattle Tennis Club, 522 P.2d 198 (Wash. 1974); Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil &
Gas. Co., 129 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1942); McCrary v. U.S., 235 F. Supp. 33 (D. Tenn. 1964);
Ash v. Farwell, 37 F.R.D. 553 (D. Kan. 1965); McChristian v. State Farm, 304 F. Supp. 748
(D. Ark. 1969); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 193 S.E.2d 527 (S.C. 1972).
74. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1986).
75. Id. at 178.
76. Id. at 196. In a footnote appended to the bottom of that page, he observed that "[t]hree
distinct kinds of doubts about when the duty of defense attaches arise because of this
incompleteness of policy language." These were situations where the insurer questioned its
responsibility under the policy, based on what he labeled as a policy defense (an issue about
the policy's applicability to the loss in question), an enforceability defense (a defense based on
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the typical liability insurance policy's language does not explicitly support the
dual representation model and that the "right to defend" verbiage in the typical
policy "does not limit the control [of the defense] that insureds otherwise
might have." 7 His conclusion that the policy language mandates that defense
counsel represent only the insured78 goes too far in the other direction, but this
early article is important for recognizing that the language of the usual liability
policy allows a mismatch between what the insurer may intend and what the
policyholder may reasonably expect with respect to the insurer's defense
obligation. A closer look at the policy language bears out the observations of
Abraham and Morris about the absence of clarity in the standard language on
the duty to defend.
Consider first the standard Personal Auto Policy. Given the frequency
with which this policy form (or others like it) is invoked in our country, this is
an appropriate place to start. The relevant language on the insurer's duty to
defend in Part A, Paragraph A provides:
INSURING AGREEMENT
A ..... We will settle or defend, as we consider appropriate,
any claim or suit asking for these damages. In addition to our
limit of liability, we will pay all defense costs we incur. Our
duty to settle or defend ends when our limit of liability for this
coverage has been exhausted. We have no duty to defend any
suit or settle any claim for "bodily injury" or "property
damage" not covered under this policy.79
The phrase "We will settle or defend, as we consider appropriate" can
plausibly be read to mean "We will settle, as we consider appropriate, or we
will defend, as we consider appropriate." Under such a reading, the insurer has
control of the defense. This reading, however, requires repeating a phrase
which the drafters only used once in the text. As the text stands, it can
reasonably, and more plausibly, be read as giving the insurer the discretion to
the insured's post-loss conduct) or a coverage defense (based on someone claiming to be an
unnamed but additional insured under the policy). Id. at 196 n.*.
77. John K. Morris, Conflicts of Interest in Defending Under Liability Insurance Policies:
A Proposed Solution, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 457, 464.
78. See id. at 465 ("Only a standard of undivided loyalty is consistent with the provisions
of insurance policies ...."); see also id. at 493 ("That standard, undivided loyalty to the
insured, is... contractually required by the insurance policy.").
79. Personal Auto Policies (PP 00 01 12 89), reprinted in SUSAN J. MILLER & PHILIP
LEFEBVRE, 1 MILLER'S STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED 2 (4th ed. 1997)
(hereinafter "MILLER'S POLICIES ANNOT.").
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settle or to defend, electing whichever of those two courses it "consider[s]
appropriate." This language, then, is designed, arguably, to inform the insured
that the insurer may not provide an attorney to defend the suit if in its
discretion the insurer thinks a settlement is more appropriate. The words "We
will.., defend" do not, in and of themselves, indicate that the insurer reserves
unto itself the right to make all of the key decisions in managing the defense.
Although reading "we will... defend" as "we are going to do this, not you;
you will not be involved, even if you want to be"-is not implausible, this
phrase "we... will defend" can also reasonably be read as a simple way of
manifesting the insurer's intent to "take care of" the insured. The second
sentence manifests only that the insurer will pay the bills, without regard to the
limits of liability found elsewhere in the policy. This sentence is qualified by
the third, but the third relates to circumstances under which the duty
terminates, not to the insurer's right of control. The last sentence speaks to
when the duty is triggered, not to the insurer's right of control. In short,
nothing in this paragraph communicates unequivocally or in a way likely to
bring home to the insured that the insured gives up control of the defense to the
insurer.
Other sections of the Personal Auto Policy form impose obligations on the
insured to cooperate with the insurer. These provisions are found in Part E,
Paragraphs A-D,80 but the strongest language in this Part indicates only that "A
person seeking any coverage must: 1. Cooperate with us in the investigation,
settlement or defense of any claim or suit." "Cooperation" reasonably implies
to the reader that the insured (or other person seeking coverage) must strive to
"get along" with the insurer; indeed, cooperating normally connotes "working
together with" someone, not relinquishing, giving up, or taking a position of
subservience to another.8' Whatever else the cooperation clause may mean,82
it is a stretch from this language to conclude that the policy "entitles the
company to control the defense of liability suits." 83
Although not invoked as often as the automobile forms, the liability
coverage in the standard homeowners form is perhaps the next most pervasive
liability coverage in force today. The standard language provides:
80. These provisions are reprinted in full in the Appendix to this article.
81. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY, supra note 28, at 501
(defining "cooperate" as "to act or work with another or others to a common end"; "to act
together").
82. See JERRY, supra note 44, at 717-27.
83. Silver & Syverud, supra note 10, at 265 n.26.
1997]
CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL
Section H-Liability Coverages
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an "insured" for
damages because of "bodily injury" or "property damage"
caused by an "occurrence" to which this coverage applies, we
will:
2. Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice,
even if the suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent. We may
investigate and settle any claim or suit that we decide is
appropriate. Our duty to settle or defend ends when the
amount we pay for damages resulting from the "occurrence"
equals our limit of liability. 4
The language "we will.., provide a defense at our expense by counsel of
our choice" is the strongest phrase favoring insurer control in the paragraph.
That the insurer can choose counsel is unambiguous, and, as with the Personal
Auto Policy form, it is plausible to read the phrase "we will ... provide a
defense" as indicating that the insurer will control the defense. It is, however,
no less plausible to read the paragraph as manifesting that the insurer will
protect the insured against the risk of having to underwrite the defense directly.
This reading is strengthened if one places emphasis on the phrase "at our
expense." The second sentence of paragraph 2 articulates in clear language the
insurer's option to settle any claim or suit if it thinks it appropriate to do so.
Noticeably absent from that sentence, which more clearly articulates the
privileges the insurer is reserving than the preceding one, is the insurer's
articulation of its prerogative to control the defense of the suit. The last
sentence of the paragraph refers to when the insurer's duty to defend ends, not
how the insurer is to perform that duty. In short, this paragraph falls short of
communicating in unequivocal terms to the insured that it "entitles the
company to control the defense."
85
The homeowners form imposes a number of duties on insureds after loss
which can fairly be summarized as an obligation to "cooperate" even if the
84. Homeowner's Policy Form (HO 00 03 04 9) in I MILLER'S POLICIES ANNOT., supra
note 79, at 199.
85. Silver & Syverud, supra note 10, at 265 n.26.
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policy does not use that precise term.86 The language is mandatory--"You will
help us by seeing that these duties are performed"--and the duties are set forth
with a fair amount of specificity. For example, in Paragraph 3(c), the insured
is required to "help us:... (3) With the conduct of suits and attend hearings
and trials," but nothing in that language or elsewhere in the paragraph
explicitly states that the insured's assistance when the insurer is providing the
defense is tantamount to surrendering control of the defense to the insurer.
Before proceeding to the Commercial General Liability policy ("CGL"),
the principal commercial form, it is worth pausing to note that if these policies
fail to communicate clearly to the insured that the insurer has reserved to itself
the privilege to control the defense, how can it be said that these policies
express the insurers' intent to establish a joint-client relationship with the
insured when the insured is sued on a claim within coverage? On the contrary,
these policies cannot reasonably be read as unequivocally expressing this
intent. But under hombook contract law principles, that is not even the correct
question to ask. The correct question is, what would a reasonable person
standing in the shoes of the insured reasonably understand these words to
mean? The absence of any reference to a co-client relationship, or even an
explicit reference to the insurer's privilege to control the defense, makes it
difficult to contend that a reasonable person in the insured's position would
comprehend from the texts that the insurer intends dual representation, if
indeed that is what the insurer does in fact intend from the quoted texts. This,
too, can be reasonably doubted given the fact that an attorney-client
relationship between insurer and defense counsel is not necessary to implement
the terms of the contract.
Although one might assume that commercial insureds are more savvy on
insurance matters than policyholders in the personal lines, this is a risky
assumption, even if there are many commercial entities with a considerable
amount of corporate understanding of insurance coverages. Many businesses
are sole proprietorships, or so-called "mom and pop" enterprises, and these
businesses are functional equivalents of individual consumers in the personal
lines. Commercial status does not guarantee that an insured has an enhanced
understanding of what the insurer promises by way of a defense to covered
claims. Fairly read, however, the Insuring Agreement in the Commercial
General Liability policy ("CGL") is more explicit than the Personal
Automobile and Homeowners policies: in the CGL, the insurer reserves unto
86. Homeowners Form, §11, 3, (HO 00 03 04 91) in MILLER'S POLICIES ANNOT., Vol. 1,
supra note 79, at 199.
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itself a "right... to defend" any suit within coverage; this text does not appear
in the other forms.87
The relevant language of the CGL reads in full as follows:
COVERAGE A. BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY
DAMAGE LIABILITY
1. Insuring Agreement.
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes
legally obligated to pay as damages because of "bodily injury"
or "property damage" to which this insurance applies. We
will have the right and duty to defend any "suit" seeking those
damages. We may at our discretion investigate any
"occurrence" and settle any claim or "suit" that may result.
But:
(2) Our right and duty to defend end when we have
used up the applicable limit of insurance in the
payment of judgments or settlements under
Coverages A or B or medical expenses under
Coverage C.
88
The second and third sentences of subparagraph (a) are the key ones. Read
together, the sentences make clear that the insurer can defend the suit if it
desires rather than pay the claim, or may settle the suit if it desires, rather than
defend the claim or pay it in full. The insurer, not the insured, is privileged to
make this call. This was the reading of the CGL urged by Professor Morris in
his 1981 article:
87. If this enhanced clarity makes a difference (and I suggest shortly that it does not), it
may follow that the conclusions urged by Silver & Syverud in their Duke article must be limited
to defenses provided under CGL policies and may not apply to defenses provided in the
personal lines. In their footnote 27, Silver & Syverud state that "[t]he working hypotheses
advanced in this Part and the views on professional responsibility advanced later in this Article
are tailed to the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form .... When insurance is
governed by a policy other than the CGL Policy, the working hypotheses and the views on
professional responsibility advocated here may not apply." Silver & Syverud, supra note 10,
at 265 n.27.
88. Commercial General Liability Form, (CG 00 01 10 93), MILLER'S POLICIES ANNOT.,
supra note 79, at 409.
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[T]he phrase "right ... to defend" does not limit the control
that insureds otherwise might have. Instead, the phrase means
only that insurers have a right to insist that a case against their
insureds be competently defended, rather than decided by
default. The phrase speaks only of the right to provide a
defense, not the right to control a defense once provided.89
I disagree with Professor Morris that this is the only possible reading of the
CGL, but Professor Morris's reading is certainly one possible reading of the
CGL, and is one that a reasonable insured could reasonably give to it.
Whatever might be said about the drafters' intention, the language by its terms
falls short of clearly expressing the insurer's intention to reserve control of the
defense to itself.
As with the other policies, the CGL contains provisions explicitly
requiring the insured to cooperate with the insurer in the investigation, defense,
and settlement of the claims, 90 but these provisions do not by their own terms
explicitly surrender control of all aspects of these functions to the insurer. The
CGL contains a provision proscribing the insured from incurring expenses
without the insurer's consent, except at the insured's own cost,91 but this
language can fairly be read as requiring the insurer's participation in the
decision to incur costs, not the insurer's exclusive right to control how these
expenditures are made.
These are not the only liability forms in use today, but a survey of the
others92 shows that there are no material variations in the remaining forms
which would change, one way or the other, one's assessment of whether
insurers have succeeded in manifesting to their insureds their desire to reserve
unto themselves the right to control the defense. When the right to control
falters, the co-client paradigm falters along with it.
E. Prevailing Constructions of the Contract
My conclusion--4hat the language of the policy forms does not clearly
manifest the insurer's intention to control the defense--is definitely at odds
with the conclusion asserted by most courts that have had anything to say on
89. Morris, supra note 77, at 464.
90. See Commercial General Liability Form, § IV, 2, (CG 00 01 10 93) in MILLER'S
POLICIES ANNOP., supra note 79, at 409.
91. "No insureds will, except at their own cost, voluntarily make a payment, assume any
obligation, or incur any expense, other than for first aid, without our consent." Commercial
General Liability Form, § IV, 2 (d), (CG 00 01 10 93), in MILLER'S POLICIES ANNOT., Vol
1, p. 4 09 at 416.
92. See forms in Appendix.
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the matter.93 Some of these decisions cite, and may be explainable by virtue
of the influence through the decades of, the Appleman multivolume treatise
Insurance Law and Practice.94 In section 4681 of the first edition, the treatise
opines that the insurer's right to control the defense is very nearly absolute:
To insure an orderly and proper disbursement of these funds
[i.e., funds established with premiums] and minimize
unwarranted claims, the insurer has exclusive control over
litigation against the insured, and the latter is required to
surrender all control over the conduct of the defense.... The
right is a valuable one in that it reserves to the insurer the
right to protect itself against unwarranted liability claims and
is essential in protecting its financial interest in the outcome
of litigation.
95
These sweeping observations are unaccompanied by any analysis of the
language of policy forms in customary use. Yet for many courts, the words of
a distinguished, authoritative treatise writer are the beginning and the end of
the answer to a question of law, and the words quoted above have received
such application in many opinions.
96
Other portions of section 4681, however, indicate that the quoted passage
is subject to some important limitations. The paragraph in section 4681 which
follows the quoted passage is one sentence long:
A policy provision giving the insurer the right to control the
defense has been held in early Massachusetts cases to be
inserted primarily for the benefit of the insurer, in the sense
that where there is a conflict of interests, the insurer may
exercise the right to defend for its own advantage, even
93. See cases cited infra notes 104-09.
94. JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE (Walter F. Berdal ed., 1979)
[hereinafter APPLEMAN]. For another secondary source in accord with Appleman's treatise, see
William T. Barker, The Right and Duty to Defend: Conflicts of Interest and Insurer Control of
the Defense, in LITIGATING THE COVERAGE CLAiM: DENIAL OF COVERAGE AND DUTY TO DEFEND
195 (Tort and Insurance Practice Section, American Bar Association, 1992).
95. 7C APPLEMAN, supra note 94, § 4681, at 2, 3.
96. See, e.g., Aberle v. Kam, 316 N.W.2d 779 (N.D. 1982); Moritz v. Med. Protective
Co., 428 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Wis. 1977); Merchants Indem. Corp. v. Eggleston, 179 A.2d 505
(N.J. 1962); American Cas. Co. v. Timmons, 352 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1965); Duke v. Hoch, 468
F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1972), motion denied, 475 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1972); Nandorf, Inc. v. CNA
Ins. Co., 479 N.E.2d 988 (I11. App. Ct. 1985).
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though a different course would have been preferable from
the standpoint of the insured.
97
The stated principle-that when the interests of insurer and insured diverge,
the insurer is free to promote its own interests without regard to the interests
of the insured-is one that few seriously urge today. The footnote to the
quoted passage says as much, but the footnote is interesting for what it adds:
Such is no longer the rule, of course, as will be seen
subsequently under cases dealing with the duty owing to the
insured. The insurer has the right to come into court solely as
the professional champion of the insured; and where a
conflict arises as to their respective interests, those of the
insured must be served first.
98
Because this last statement appears in the same section often cited
approvingly by courts for allowing the insurer exclusive control of the defense,
the clear implication of the Appleman treatise is that exclusive control rests
with the insurer only when the interests of the insured and insurer coincide. 99
Of course, when the interests of the insured and insurer are identical, the fact
that the insurer has exclusive control makes no difference to the insured.
Moreover, a sentence in the 1996-97 pocket part to the treatisel °° underscores
that the insurer's right to control the defense can be subject to significant
constraints: "An insurer's desire to control the defense must yield to its
obligations to defend the insured."' 0 ' With all of the considerable respect that
97. APPLEMAN, supra note 94, § 4681, at 2,3.
98. Id. at 4 n.8.
99. In their discussion of impeachment of the insured, Silver & Syverud quoted the first
paragraph from the Appleman text, see Silver & Syverud, supra note 10, at 317, but did not
mention the footnote in Appleman which essentially retracts the statement in the treatise's text,
indicating that it is no longer the law. Silver & Syverud, however, described the retracted text
as "the prevailing doctrine," id. at 317, and reasoned from this passage that "insurance law does
permit the company to request impeachment of the insured." Id. This is not a fair reading of
Appleman and, by extension, the applicable insurance law rules regarding impeachment.
100. See JoHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4681 (Stephen L. Liebo,
ed. Supp. 1997).
101. Id. at 1. One case is cited for this proposition, and this case comes from New York,
a jurisdiction where the attorney owes undivided loyalty to the insured in the event of a conflict,
Public Service Mut. Ins, Co. v. Goldfarb, 425 N.E.2d 810, 815 (N.Y. 1981), Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Riggio, 509 N.Y.S.2d 594, 595 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), and where there is some authority
that the attorney's allegiance is owed solely to the insured. See Booth v. Continental Ins. Co.,
634 N.Y.S.2d 650, 654 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (quoting 6 NY JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 70: "When
counsel, paid by an insurance company, undertakes to represent the policyholder, he owes to
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is due the Appleman treatise, it is not possible to argue from that platform that
"[t]he law is clear that, absent certain conflicts of interest, the company
possesses exclusive and plenary control of the defense"'0 2 under the text of the
liability insurance forms in current usage.
A closer look at the cases approving the insurer's right to control the
defense yields additional insights of interest. In several of these cases, the
court's approval of the insurer's right to control is pure dictum, given that in
those cases the insurer had refused to defend the insured and the issue was
whether this refusal was wrongful.10 3 In other cases, the question was whether
an excess insurer had the right to control the defense, which did not implicate
the insured's rights vis-a-vis the insurer, 1 4 or whether the policy provided
coverage or a right to recovery at all.105 In short, in many of the cases
espousing the general rule, no issue was presented involving a contest between
insurer and insured as to who should control the defense.' °6 In other decisions
where the insurer's right to control was recognized, the court made clear that
the right to control ended when a conflict arose between insurer and insured.'0 7
In other cases, the court made clear that the insurer's right is not absolute
when the claim against the insured exceeds the policy limits.'0 8 As it turns
his client, the insured, an undeviating and single allegiance."; note, however, that other
passages assume that counsel can represent both insurer and insured); N.Y. Cty. Lawyer's
Ass'n Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Eth. Op. 669 (89-2) (May 17, 1989) ("Despite the payment of
legal fees by the insurance company and the fact that the lawyer may have a long-standing
relationship with the insurance company, the lawyer's client in the matter is the insured.").
102. Silver & Syverud, supra note 10, at 272 n.37.
103. See, e.g., Stevens v. Gulf Oil Corp., 274 A.2d 163 (R.I. 1971); Waste Management
v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322 (II1. 1991); White Mountain Constr.
Co v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 631 A.2d 907 (N.H. 1993); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Sherwood Brands, Inc., 680 A.2d 554 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996), cert. granted, Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Ins. Comm'r Md, 685 A.2d 450 (Md. 1996); Hodges v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 488 F. Supp. 1057 (D.S.C. 1980).
104. See Diamond Heights Homeowners Ass'n v. National Am. Ins. Co., 277 Cal. Rptr.
906 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
105. See, e.g., Clark v. Bellefonte Ins. Co., 169 Cal. Rptr. 832 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980);
International Ass'n of Chiefs of Police, Inc., v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 686 F. Supp.
115 (D. Md. 1988).
106. See American Cas. Co. v. Timmons, 253 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1965) (holding that
insurer could not assert that contractor could not sue on policy based on lack of final
determination of contractor's obligation to pay for damaged electrical duct).
107. See, e.g., Nandorf, Inc. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 479 N.E.2d 988 (I11. App. Ct. 1985); Parker
v. Agric. Ins. Co., 440 N.Y.S.2d 964 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981). One case standing apart from these
others is Duke v. Hoch, 468 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1972), where the court discussed the issue at
some length and observed that the insurer's "duty to control the defense and the insured's
correlative duty to cooperate in the defense derive from the policy itself." Id. at 978 n. 1.
108. See, e.g., Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621, 627 (10th
Cir. 1942).
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out, these cases are consistent with the weight of authority holding that when
the interests of insurer and policyholder diverge, the insurer's right to control
the defense must yield and the insured's interests must be protected.0 9
The essential point is that who possessed the right to control the defense
made little difference in most of the cases pronouncing that the right belongs
to the insurer. It is therefore uncertain whether these cases tell us anything
particularly significant about the number of clients defense counsel represents.
If the interests of insurer and insured are coterminous, as they are in most full-
coverage cases where the plaintiffs claim is within the policy limits, putting
the defense in the insurer's control is of no consequence to the insured. It is
problematic, therefore, to extend from a proposition articulated and approved
in a situation where the answer makes no difference to a situation where the
proposition, if applied, will allow the insurer to favor its own interests to the
109. Id. ("the rights of the insurer [where the claim exceeds the policy limits] are not
absolute"); Collier v. Union Indem., 31 P.2d 697, 700 (N.M. 1934) ("where the liability of the
insurer is limited and that of assured is open.. .[t]he responsibility primarily assumed is to
defend the assured against the charge and total amount sued for; [the insurer's] own defense
is incidental ... The courts could not permit counsel to appear nominally for the assured, but
actually in the interest of another."); Point Pleasant Canoe Rental, Inc. v. Tinicum Township,
110 F.R.D. 166, 170 (E.D. Pa. 1986) ("When conflicts-of-interest arise between an insurance
carrier and its insured, the lawyer representing the insured must act exclusively on behalf of,
and in the best interests of the insured."); CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp.,
844 P.2d 1113, 1117 (Alaska 1993) ("most courts hold that in conflict situations the insured
has the right to independent counsel to conduct its defense and the insurance company has the
obligation to pay the reasonable value of the defense conducted by independent counsel");
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255, 270 (Miss. 1988) ("When there is a
question of coverage.., and the insurance company notifies the insured that it will fulfill its
obligation to defend the suit, while at the same time reserving a right to deny coverage of the
insured's conduct,.. . [t]he lawyer may be required to withdraw from the case altogether, or be
restricted his continuing representation with the insurance company furnishing at its expense
an independent counsel chosen by the insured to represent his own interests."); Booth v.
Continental Ins. Co., 634 N.Y.S.2d 650, 654 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) ("where an insurer disclaims
coverage or reserves the right to do so, it is generally improper for an attorney to represent both
the insured and insurer in the same action"); Illinois Advisory Op. 92-02 (1992) ("the attorney
represents both the insured, as well as the insurance company, in furthering the interests of
each. In the usual case, those interests are compatible, or at least not antagonistic.. . Where
the interests of the insurance company and its insured are in direct conflict,.. . the insurer will
not be permitted to control, or even to participate in, the defense. In such a case, the insured
is entitled to representation by counsel of his own choosing, and the insurer's duty to defend
is satisfied by reimbursement of the insured for the costs of the defense"); Michigan Ethics Op.
RI-89 (1991) (Syllabus: "If a lawyer represents the insured and the insurer in a matter, and one
client later wishes the lawyer to assert a factually sustainable theory that serves that client's
interest but is adverse to the other, the lawyer must withdraw from representation of both
clients."). See also Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Behrenhausen, 889 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (W.D. Mo.
1995) (conflict of interest disappears because "this attorney [appointed by insurer] has a duty
to defend the interests of only its client, [the insured]").
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detriment of the insured. This is particularly problematic in circumstances
where much of what is said in the cases is consistent with defense counsel
owing undivided loyalty to the insured when the interests of policyholder and
insurer diverge.
Ill. RAMIFICATIONS
A. Disclosure, Consent, and Defense Counsel's Responsibilities
Professors Silver and Syverud are correct that depending on the agreement
between insurer and insured, defense counsel might represent the insured only,
or might represent the insurer and insured together. 110 Thus, I agree that a co-
client relationship between insurer and insured is possible; furthermore, I agree
that joint representation is desirable in many situations for reasons of
efficiency, cost, and effectiveness of the defense."' I disagree, however, with
their contention that consent to joint representation is given at the time the
insured requests the insurer to provide a defense. As discussed in Part II,
neither the language of standard liability policies nor the context in which they
are marketed and sold supports the conclusion." 12 An important ramification
of Silver and Syverud's argument that consent devolves from the liability
policy and the context in which the request for a defense is made is that
defense counsel need not provide any disclosures or obtain any further consent
at the time defense counsel undertakes to provide a defense. This is incorrect;
because the current forms and the context in which they are marketed are
insufficient to establish the insured's consent, defense counsel cannot assume
the presence of consent. As a recent ABA Formal Opinion warned, "[w]e
cannot assume that the insured understands or remembers, if he ever read, the
insurance policy, or that the insured understands that his lawyer will be acting
110. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 10, at 274-76. See also Formal Op. 96-403, supra
note 9, at 2 (1996) ("The insurer, the insured, and the lawyer may agree on the identity of the
client or clients the lawyer is to represent at the outset.").
I 1. This is also the position of Professor Baker. See Tom Baker, supra note 4, at 105.
112. Note that the gap between the Silver-Syverud position and my own may be narrower
than the text supposes. The Silver-Syverud article's analysis was explicitly predicated on the
language of the CGL, which, as discussed in Part It, comes the closest of any of the kinds of
widely-used forms to articulating the insurer's right of control. In a footnote, Silver and
Syverud stated that their conclusions may not apply under the language of forms other than the
CGL. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 10, at 265 n.27 ("When insurance coverage is
governed by a policy other than the CGL Policy, the working hypotheses and the views on
professional responsibility advocated here may not apply.") This allows the possibility that they
might agree with my own position at least when personal liability policies are involved.
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Of course, consent to joint representation (and the concomitant constraints
on defense counsel's obligations to the insured) need not occur as early as the
time of contracting between insurer and insured, or as early as the time the
insured requests a defense or the insurer retains an attorney. If, however,
consent is not given at any of these times, it must be given (and the constraint
created) at the outset of the representation. To this point in the analysis,
Professor Pepper agrees. 14 After this point, Professor Pepper, relying on a
close reading of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(b), contends that the
potential for conflict in every liability defense representation requires a robust
disclosure to the insured of all foreseeable, possible future conflicts (and there
are many, even if none of them is likely to materialize in most situations),
followed by the insured's consent to the joint representation. I read the
prescriptions of Rule 1.7(b) more flexibly; although conceding that Pepper's
more literal reading of the Rule can be justified by its text, I urge the
appropriateness of a more flexible reading when the rule is applied to insurance
defense counsel.
Before examining the subtleties of Rule 1.7(b), it is useful to return briefly
to the question of the insured's expectations, because what the reasonable
insured typically expects and wants from the insurer is relevant to what the
insured expects defense counsel to provide in counsel's capacity as the agent
designated to discharge the insurer's duties." 5 In some situations, although it
is impossible to know how many, the insured is probably asked to and does in
fact give an informal, but informed consent to joint representation; in many
other situations, including those where some kind of consent is sought and
given but the quality of the consent falls short of being fully informed, the
insured would willingly give an informed consent if asked to do so. Why
should this be? Although future conflicts are always possible, the chance that
a conflict will materialize is small. If the claim is covered and within the
policy limits, the insured has no financial stake in the outcome. If the insured
has no reputational interests at stake, and usually none will be, the insured will
not perceive significant benefits from insisting upon the appointment of
counsel with an undivided loyalty, and the insured will have no reason to incur
I 13. Formal Op. 96-403, supra note 9, at 4.
114. See Stephen L. Pepper, Applying the Fundamentals of Lawyers' Ethics to the
Insurance Defense Practice, 4 CONN. INs. L.J. 25, 37 (1997) ("there is nothing in the contract
stating or implying that the defense must be provided by a lawyer who has the company as a
client as well").
115. The justification for taking the insured's expectations into account is the same one
set forth supra, in the text accompanying notes 45-65.
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the additional inconvenience of insisting upon and possibly locating and
appointing his or her own counsel. In short, when defense counsel first
communicates with the insured and explains what the nature of the relationship
will be, the insured is likely to say, "please proceed and take care of this
problem for me; let me know what I must do to help, but bother me as little as
possible."' 16
To be able to give this answer consensually, the insured must first be
informed about what the answer entails, and this brings us back to the question
of what disclosures defense counsel must make at the outset of the
representation. What Model Rule 1.7(b) 17 requires by way of disclosure to the
insured as a prerequisite to joint representation is important, but my view is
that Rule 1.7(b) is not sufficiently nuanced to speak clearly about defense
counsel's responsibilities. The phrase "may be materially limited" can be read
in a way that requires each and every insurance defense to be accompanied by
a disclosure of an extensive list of each and every kind of conflict that might
arise in the course of the representation. 11 Such a formal, literal reading is
inappropriate in insurance defense. A more contextual, functional reading of
the Rule suggests that the attorney is expected to exercise judgment about the
116. Professor Pepper disagrees, believing that an insured is "highly unlikely" to consent
to joint representation "if that consultation is competently performed." See Pepper, supra note
114, at 35. We may disagree on the amount of disclosure required; a blunderbuss disclosure
in the type of case where no conflict is apparent or likely to arise may create sufficient
insecurity to scare the insured into seeking, at his expense, legal advice about how to respond,
but good advice would recommend that consent be given. My view is that the insurer's promise
to take over the suit from beginning to end, including the process of selecting defense counsel,
is very valuable to the insured, and the insured is likely to welcome it in within-limits cases
where coverage is not, and probably will not be, contested.
117. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b) states:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or
to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected, and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When a representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall
include explanation of the implications of the common representation and
the advantages and risks involved.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
118. 1 do not read Professor Pepper as going this far, but he takes a strong view of Model
Rule 1.7(b), and considers it triggered in every insurance defense representation. See Pepper,
supra note 114, at 31-33. A more contextual reading of the Rule might concede that it is
always triggered, but that "triggering" is a relative concept, with "soft triggering" requiring less
disclosure than a "hard trigger."
[Vol. 4:1
RESPONSIBILITIES OF DEFENSE COUNSEL
amount of disclosure necessary as a prerequisite to the insured's consent based
on a reasoned assessment of the "likelihood that a conflict will eventuate" and
"if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent
professional judgment."" 19 This suggests that a more modest explanation of the
risks of dual representation (along the lines of the explanation suggested by
William Barker, 120 along with a brief explanation that if a conflict arises in the
future counsel may have to withdraw12 1) is appropriate at the outset of the
representation,122 but unfolding circumstances may create more serious
119. MODEL RULES, supra note 117, Rule 1.7(b) cmt. In context, these phrases describe
considerations relevant to whether "[a] possible conflict" precludes representations, not the
amount of disclosure that counsel must give. A contextual reading of Model Rule 1.7(b) would
argue that these issues cannot be neatly separated.
120. See William T. Barker, Insurance Defense Ethics and the Liability Insurance
Bargain, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 75, 89 (1997).
121. In his discussion of the "defeasible client" model, which appears to be the same as
the law in most jurisdictions, see infra note 123 and accompany text, except that it allows an
attorney to cease representing the insurer without notifying it (a position with which I disagree,
see infra note 123), Professor Pepper explains that the possibility of this event needs to be
disclosed at the outset of the joint representation in order to meet the requirements of Rule
1.7(b). See Pepper, supra note 114, at 70-71.
122. This appears to be the import of Formal Op. 96-403, which concluded: "After
appropriate disclosure to the insured as to the limited nature of the representation being offered
under the insurance contract, a lawyer may proceed with the representation of an insured at the
direction of the insurer in accordance with the terms of the insurance contract." Formal Op. 96-
403, supra note 9, at 6-7. Interestingly, the Opinion did not discuss Model Rule 1.7(b).
However, it addressed what Model Rule 1.2(a), which pertains to limitations on the objectives
of a representation, requires by way of "consultation," the same word that appears in Model
Rule 1.7(b). Thus, the Opinion was concerned with the extent of disclosures needed at the
commencement of representation where the policy "authorizes the insurer to control the defense
and settlement of the claim in its sole discretion without consultation with the insured." Id. at
1. The Committee "presume[d] that in the vast majority of cases the insured will have no
objection to proceeding in accordance with the terms of the insurance contract. Nonetheless,
communication between the lawyer and the insured is required [by Model Rule 1.2]." Id. at 4.
The Opinion then stated that "[a] short letter clearly stating that the lawyer intends to proceed
at the direction of the insurer in accordance with the terms of the insurance contract and what
this means to the insured" is sufficient, and that "extended discussion" is not required. All that
is needed is that the insured be "clearly apprised" of the limitations in the representation and
that the lawyer will follow the directions of the insurer; if this is done, "the insured has
sufficient information to decide whether to accept the defense offered by the insurer or to
assume responsibility for his own defense at his own expense." Id. at 4. One might argue that
the disclosures needed to satisfy the conflict rule in Model Rule 1.7(b) must necessarily be
more detailed than the disclosures needed to meet the "scope" rule of Model Rule 1.2(a). See
Nancy J. Moore, The Ethical Duties of Insurance Defense Lawyers: Are Special Solutions
Required?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 259, 272 (1997). If it is true, however, that in the "vast majority"
of cases the insured has no objection to proceeding with a defense pursuant to a joint
representation, and there is no particular reason to suspect that conflict will arise, the logic of
the Opinion would seem equally appropriate for determining the extent of disclosure needed
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concerns and a concomitant obligation to make further disclosures (and
perhaps even to withdraw from the representation). 2 3
Indeed, in some situations, more than additional disclosures and the
insured's reaffirmation of consent to joint representation will be required. If
the insured's consent to joint representation is given at a time when no conflict
is apparent or foreseen, and thereafter an actual conflict arises for a reason
unforeseen when the representation began, defense counsel will need to
consider whether the conflict is one to which consent can be given at all and
whether the representation can continue without materially impairing the rights
of one client or the other. In some situations, the answer will be "no" to one
or both questions, and the attorney will need to withdraw, even if this
encourages the insurer to investigate the circumstances of the coverage and the
defense of the claim more closely. 1
24
under Model Rule 1.7(b). Indeed, because the circumstances presented to the Committee
involved a conflict between insurer and insured over the insurer's right to settle a suit against
the insured without the insured's consent, a conflict which was at least "potential" if unlikely
at the outset of the representation, a fair reading of the Opinion is that the Committee thought
more robust disclosures at the outset of the representation were unnecessary, even under Model
Rule 1.7(b).
Professor Pepper may not disagree. In his discussion of the primary client model, he
states: "If in fact [defense counsel] will serve the interest only of the insured in the event a
conflict arises, it is also arguable that the type of informed consent required under Rule 1.7(b)
and discussed in Part I above might not be required, or at least might be much less elaborate."
See Pepper, supra note 115, at 69. My position is that the point Pepper says is "arguable" is
more than arguable; indeed, it is exactly right.
123. Consent to joint representation must always be "fully informed," but the amount of
information needed to fully inform the insured can vary based on the likelihood and severity
of any perceived future conflict. Model Rule 1.4(b) is entirely consistent: "A lawyer shall
explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation." MODEL RULES, supra note 117, Rule 1.4(b) (emphasis
added). What is "reasonably necessary" must vary from situation to situation. This appears to
be consistent with Professor Silver's views on the matter; see Lexis Counsel Connect
conversation referenced in Pepper, supra note 114 at 33 n. 14. This analysis is equally pertinent
to Model Rule 1.8(0, which proscribes a lawyer from accepting compensation from a third
party for representing a client "unless... the client consents after consultation." MODEL RULES,
supra note 117, Rule 1.8(f). Professor Pepper concludes, however, that the disclosures
necessary to satisfy Rule 1.8(0 are much less than what is needed to meet Model Rule 1.7(b).
See Pepper, supra note 114, at 33 n. 14. Mr. Barker, like me, reads Model Rule 1.7(b) more
contextually. See Barker, supra note 120, at 87 ("the key issue [in satisfying Rule 1.7(b)] is
whether there will be adequate opportunity to address any such conflict before it adversely
affects either client").
124. 1 agree with Professor Moore that withdrawal of counsel is not an answer that needs
to be avoided at all costs. See Moore, supra note 122, at 281-83. See also Moeller v. American
Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 1996 WL 532387 at *8 (Miss. Sept. 19, 1996) ("such counsel must be
careful at the time he is asked to represent the insurance carrier and the insured, and if there is
any reason indicating a possible conflict of interest at the time of his employment, he should
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It is argued by Professor Pepper and others that dual representation, even
if ethically possible, is "very risky" because of potential conflicts of interest
inherent in any joint representation provided by defense counsel pursuant to the
provisions of a liability insurance policy. 25  That conflicts might arise in
virtually any dual representation involving insured and insurer is well
understood by all.' 26 The question, however, is whether a prophylactic rule
prohibiting all dual representation in the liability defense setting is necessary
when it is known that in the vast number of situations where coverage is not
disputed and the claim is within the policy limits no conflict will surface.'
27
under no circumstances undertake to represent them both. Furthermore, any attorney
representing two clients must remain on alert and ever watchful for any possible conflict of
interest arising between the two, because the moment that happens, counsel should not attempt
to represent them both."); California Ethics Op. 1995-139 (1995) ("In coverage question
situations where there has not been a Civil Code section 2860 disclosure and consent to the
representation, or where subsequent to disclosure and consent, new information has come to
light which affects the question of coverage, the attorney may be required to withdraw.").
125. See Pepper, supra note 114, at 72.
126. See, e.g., Silver & Syverud, supra note 10, at 266-67; JERRY, supra note 45, at 779
("Conflicts between the interests of insurers and insureds are inevitable in insurance."); ROBERT
E. KEETON & ALAN 1. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 809 (student ed. 1988) ("There is a very
substantial prospect that actual or potentially conflicting interests betwen an insurer and insured
will exist in regard to almost any tort claim that may be covered by liability insurance.").
127. Although it is often said that conflicts are inevitable and arise frequently, it is easy
to lose sight of the fact that in the vast majority of insurance defense relationships, conflicts do
not arise. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 126, at 808 ("In most situations, there is an
accord, reached either explicitly or implicitly, between the insurer and the insured as to an
appropriate course of action to be pursued in response to the tort claim."); MALLEN & SMITH,
LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 28.14, at 553 (4th ed. 1996) ("Dual representation by defense counsel
usually is harmonious and equally beneflical to both the insurer and insured since they share
the same goals during the pendency of the litigation."); Barker, supra note 120, at 91-92.
Professor Pepper argues that if coverage is not at issue and the claim is within limits, the
insurer should be willing to waive its right to later contest coverage, which would make it easier
for the insured to give consent. See Pepper, supra note 114, at 35. The argument's two-way-
street appeal discounts the economic realities of insurance contracting, where combating
policyholder fraud is a very important consideration. When an insurer issues a policy, it does
not surrender indefinitely the right to contest coverage at some future time (except in some lines
of personal insurance where the interests of third-parties in not having to defend against
insurers' contests many years in the future trumps the insurers' interest in paying invalid or
fraudulent claims). The process of application and evaluation enables the insurer to elicit
material information without the expense of original investigation; the insurer is entitled to rely
on this information; if the information turns out to be false, the insurer is entitled (assuming
materiality, reliance, etc.) to rescind the coverage. Indefinite incontestability would increase
the incidence of policyholders defrauding the insurer, a cost which must be built into the rate
base and paid by all policyholders. In insurance defense, the insurer's waiver is tantamount to
creating indefinite incontestability, and the effect is to provide a vehicle for insureds to escape
the consequences of what should be a disqualification of coverage. Stated otherwise, the claims
of policyholders bent on fraud are not strong ones. In the absence of compelling countervailing
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Professor Pepper's careful analysis recognizes that it is far from clear that such
a rule is necessary. 128 Indeed, in the absence of a genuine conflict, there is
nothing to be gained by forcing the parties to act as if there is such a conflict.
The reality is that there are many joint representations which work well,
and there are joint representations which do not play out so neatly. It should
be presumed that the insured will decline to give consent to joint representation
if the interests of insurer and insured have already diverged, or are thought to
be likely to diverge at some point in the future. In that circumstance, the insurer
must evaluate whether the grounds for the insured's refusal to accept a joint
representation are sound. The insurer has a duty to defend, but the insured has
an essentially reciprocal duty to cooperate, 29 and the insured's refusal to
cooperate with defense counsel selected by the insurer where no conflict exists
or is reasonably foreseeable should be construed as a breach of the insured's
duty130 (unless the insured exercises his or her prerogative to decline the
benefits of the contract, i.e., decline the defense, and undertake personally the
risk and the cost of the defense' 3'). If the insured's breach is a material one, 32
as would be the case where the insured unqualifiedly refuses to assist in the
defense, the insurer may suspend the performance of its duty to defend and,
once it is clear that cooperation will not be forthcoming, treat its own duty as
discharged. 1
33
considerations (such as protecting accident victims through compulsory auto insurance, where
insurers lose some defenses, see JERRY, supra note 45, at 861-63, 865), legal rules should not
be designed and implemented in ways that make fraud easier to commit.
128. See Pepper, supra note 114, at 69.
129. See Jerry, supra note 44, at 719-24.
130, If one concludes that the insurer has no right to control the defense because of
inadequacies in the language of current policy forms, see discussion accompanying notes 93-
109 supra, an insured's rejection of the insurer's non-existent right of control could not
constitute a breach of the insured's duty to cooperate. This is one reason clearer policy forms
would be helpful; by describing the insurer's rights more clearly, the policy would better
explain the insured's reciprocal cooperation duties. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
131. See Formal Op. 96-403, supra note 9, at 5 ("the insured retains the power to reject
the defense offered by the insurer under the policy and to assume the risk and expense of his
own defense").
132. See JERRY, supra note 44, at 724-25. This is simply an application of basic contract
law principles, which require that a party's breach of a contractual duty be material (i.e., that
the party's performance of the duty fall short of substantial performance) before the other party
is entitled to suspend performance in response to the breach. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 237 (1981).
133. This simply refers to the fact that when parties exchange duties, each side's duty is
a constructive condition to the other side's duty, and that the two legal effects of nonsatisfaction
of a condition, including constructive conditions, is suspension followed by discharge. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225(1).
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The insurer is not required, of course, to respond to the insured's breach
by suspending performance. Indeed, there is some risk in doing so because the
insurer's erroneous judgment that the insured breached first will cause the
insurer's suspension to be the first material breach. Under the same analysis,
if the insured contends that a conflict of interest exists necessitating the
appointment of independent counsel for the insured and if the insurer
erroneously refuses to proceed on this basis, it is the insurer that will have
committed the first material breach. Instead of suspending performance in
response to the insured's breach (or perceived breach), the insurer may elect
to provide a defense with counsel whose loyalty runs exclusively to the
insured. In contract law terms, this is a straightforward application of the
principle that whenever a condition, whether express or constructive, to a duty
is not satisfied, the party whose duty is conditioned can elect to waive the
nonsatisfaction of the condition.' 34 As for the indemnity obligation, the insurer
that chooses not to withhold a defense should be expected to reserve rights to
contest coverage at a later time. In doubtful or close cases, the insurer will
usually choose to provide the defense under reservation simply because the
consequences to the insurer of being wrong are severe.
The relationship between insurer and defense counsel is a different side of
the triangle, but the analysis complements what happens on the insured-defense
counsel side. Defense counsel can undertake a joint representation of insurer
and insured as long as the interests are not divergent. If, however, a conflict
should arise that requires the attorney's withdrawal, 135 the insurer might
appoint new defense counsel to represent only the interests of the insured. If
the insurer believes, based either on the fact of defense counsel's withdrawal
or its own investigation, that the insured is not entitled to coverage, another
alternative is for the insurer to provide no counsel and to refuse to defend. The
logic of such a response is that either the insurer owes no contract duties to the
insured or the insurer is entitled to suspend its own contract performance
because of the insured's first material breach of the contract through non-
cooperation or otherwise. Unless the insurer is prepared to take the position
that the insured has no rights under the contract and that no defense is owing,
the insurer's duty to defend remains an undischarged duty, and it must be
fulfilled through the appointment of counsel.
134. See id. § 237.
135. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.2(c) states that a lawyer acting as an
"intermediary" must withdraw from the joint representation and cannot thereafter represent
either client if the conditions allowing the joint representation, as set forth in Model Rule
2.2(a), cease to exist. Comments to the Rule indicate that it applies "when the lawyer represents
two or more parties with potentially conflicting interests." See MODEL RULES, supra note 117,
Rule 2.2(c), cmt. (a).
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Thus, at the end of the analysis, one reaches a best answer, even if it is not
a perfect one: if defense counsel cannot serve the interests of both clients
without compromising the interests of either, counsel appointed by the insurer
must give undivided loyalty to one client, and this client is the insured. This,
in fact, is what the substantial weight of authority holds.136
136. In the absence of a conflict, the representation can be joint See, e.g., Home Indem.
Co. v. Lane, 43 F.3d 1322, 1330 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying Alaska law; "In a typical insurer-
insured relationship, where there is no reservation of rights, there is no actual conflict of interest
that would preclude an attorney from representing both the insurer and the insured"); Moeller
v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 1996 WL 532387 at *8 (Miss. Sept. 19, 1996) (defense
counsel "represent[s] two separate and distinct clients"); Rogers v. Robson, 392 N.E.2d 1365,
1369 (1979) ("an attorney represents both the insured as well as the insurance company in
furthering the interests of each ... The fact that the attorney also represents the insurer in no
way alters his obligations or responsibilities to the insured."); North Carolina Ethics Op. RPC
9 1, Jan. 17, 1991 ("Whenever defense counsel is employed by an insurance company to defend
an insured against a claim, he or she represents both the insurer and the insured."); Michigan
Ethics Op. RI-89 (1991 ) ("When an insurer retains a lawyer to defend an insured, the insured
is the lawyer's client.., dual representation is ethically permitted only if the interests of the
insurer and the insured do not conflict."). See also Moritz v. Med. Protective Co., 428 F. Supp.
865, 872 (W.D. Wis. 1977) (defense counsel was "common attorney of two clients., and...
the two sets of attorney-client relationships had come into being simultaneously"). This draws
support from ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. No. 282 (May
27, 1950), which stated that "a community of interest exists between the company and the
insured growing out of the contract of insurance with respect to any action brought by a third
person against the insured within the policy limits." In conflict situations, the insured has a
right to counsel whose loyalty runs only to the insured. See cases cited supra note 124.
Both of the foregoing ideas were reflected in California Ethics Op. 1995-139 (1995),
which stated: "Clearly, insurer is denominated a "client' by case law'... But while insurer is
indeed a client in some respects. .. it is a client whose rights under case law are clearly limited.
. . . Although insurance defense counsel's representation of divergent interests can be
attempted "provided there is full disclosure and consent,' this dual role cannot diminish
counsel's responsibility to the insured." The same idea is reflected in those formulations which
recognize the appropriateness of dual representation but consider the insured to be the primary
client. See, e.g., North Carolina Ethics Op. RPC 92 (1991) ("The representation of insured and
insurer is a dual one, but the attorney's primary allegiance is to the insured, whose best interest
must be served at all times"); Oregon Ethics Op. 1991-121 (1991) ("As a general proposition,
an attorney who represents an insured in an insurance defense case has two clients: the insurer
and the insured .... both the ethical rules and insurance law require that an attorney hired by
the insurer to defend an insured must treat the insured as 'the primary client' whose protection
must be the attorney's 'dominant' concern," citing ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. No. 1476 (1981)).
The foregoing rule needs tempering when a claim exceeding the policy limits is involved.
The language of the standard policy gives control of settlement decisions to the insurer; it may
be that the agreement between defense counsel and insured will explicitly remove advice and
counsel with regard to settlement issues from the scope of the representation. See North
Carolina Ethics Op. RPC 91 (Jan. 17, 1991 ); JERRY, supra note 44, at 807-08.
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B. The Liability Insurance Contract
As discussed in Part II, current liability insurance forms do not contain
language that can be reasonably read as expressing the insurer's intent to
appoint counsel who will represent the insurer and the insured jointly. Insurers
could draft clearer contracts with respect to the conduct of the defense; an
obvious starting point would be to have the policy state that the defense will
commence as a joint representation of insured and insurer. If insurers did so,
would it matter? There are reasons to think that clearer contract language
would be helpful.
First, and most obviously, clearer contract language would help define the
relative rights and obligations of insurer and insured, resulting in more
predictable outcomes when disputes arise over the scope of these rights and
obligations. Past experience with the insurer's privilege to settle illustrates the
point. With regard to whether the insured has a right to consent to settlement
in professional liability insurance policies, insurers have drafted clear contract
language, and courts treat this language as dispositive on the insured's and
insurer's relative rights. 37 That settlement decisions are generally controlled
by the insurer has been resolved with clear contract language. 138 With a similar
effort, the policy forms could be written to indicate unambiguously that the
insurer is entitled to co-client status with the insured pursuant to the
representation of the attorney selected by the insurer.]39 If co-client status at
the outset of representation is the default rule, any claim of entitlement to sole-
client representation must be sharply focused, clearly articulated, and based on
a specific set of alleged circumstances that justify trumping the default rule.
Second, clearer contract language would elucidate the insured's duty to
cooperate and the ramifications of the insured's breach of that duty. If the
137. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 419 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1980)
(insurer's settlement of claim in face of insured's revocation of consent to settle breached
consent provision of medical malpractice policy); Arana v. Koerner, 735 S.W.2d 729 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987) (insured should be allowed to try to prove that defense counsel committed tort
when, in violation of medical malpractice policy, settled suit without insured's consent).
138. See JERRY, supra note 44, at 763 ("the typical language reserves to the insurer a
privilege to settle, or not to settle, as the insurer in the exercise of its discretion sees fit"), and
cases cited supra note 2.
139. That insurers have not done so already, particularly in the face of a large number of
precedents requiring that defense counsel give undivided loyalty to the insured, implies that
insurers do not perceive this as a major issue or problem. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 10,
at 338 n. 196 ("When presenting drafts of this report, we have been repeatedly struck by the
extent to which defense lawyers, general counsel for insurance companies, and claims personnel
have internalized PCR [the rule that defense counsel owes primary loyalty to the client, the
insured]").
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insurer's right to control the defense in no-conflict situations is non-existent,
it follows that the insured does not fail to cooperate by denying the insurer's
right of control. Stated otherwise, an insured's rejection of an insurer's non-
existent right cannot constitute a breach of the insured's duty to cooperate.
More clearly articulating the insurer's right to control the defense would give
the insurer a more reliable basis for suspending its own performance in the face
of an insured's refusal to cooperate with the defense offered by the insurer.
Third, clearer contract language would reduce the risk of the insured's
surprise when the insurer explains that the designated attorney will serve as
counsel for both insurer and insured. Surprise can evolve into disillusionment,
controversy, and conflict, particularly if the insured is predisposed to distrust
the insurer. Although clear contract language cannot, in and of itself, provide
the consent necessary to establish a joint representation, it can support and re-
enforce the disclosures made by counsel at the outset of the representation
when securing the insured's consent. In this sense, clearer contract language
provides "grease for the wheels," easing the process through which the joint
representation is created. If after an occurrence an insured reads his or her
policy for the first time and discovers a description of the steps that will unfold
should the insured submit a claim to the insurer for defense, the odds that he
or she will be surprised by counsel's subsequent request for consent to dual
representation are greatly reduced. Moreover, clear language describing the
insurer's right to control the defense would re-enforce a message that the
insurer would deliver to the insured: the insured is free to reject the joint
defense, but absent legitimate grounds for doing so (i.e., conflicting interests
between insured and insurer), the insurer will not provide insured with a sole-
client defense because, as the policy would state, this is not one of the insurer's
obligations. 140 Some may consider this coercive and therefore conclude that
consent to joint representation can never exist, but if these are the terms on
which insurers are willing to provide liability insurance, the fact that the
insured must make hard choices is not a justification for creating coverage or
a defense obligation where none exists.'
4
'
140. This is consistent with Mr. Barker's analysis: "[the liability insurance contract] can
structure the options presented when consent is sought." Barker, supra note 120, at 76. Mr.
Barker explains that the insurer's message-because it cannot be counsel's--can be delivered
by counsel, but that the insured must be told that counsel cannot advise the insured about the
message, and that any disputes must be resolved between insurer and insured. See id. at 88.
141. It is well settled that insureds under policies of property insurance whose property
has been destroyed by fire and who are suspects in criminal arson investigations cannot decline
to provide information to and otherwise cooperate with insurers and still recover under the
policies. See JERRY, supra note 44, at 557.
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Reducing the risk of surprise also re-enforces the value of consumer
protection; clearer forms are, if anything, fairer to the insured. Banks, for
example, must explain how much interest they are really going to charge the
consumer for a loan, even if consumers do not take the time to read or
understand the disclosure. Indeed, it is probably easier for an insured to relate
to the concept of having one lawyer to himself or herself versus sharing a
lawyer with someone else than it is to understand plain language forms
explaining how interest is calculated. Fairness is enhanced if insureds are
given an explanation, even if they are not listening, of what they are purchasing
when they pay their premiums.
Of course, some insureds will dislike the clearer policies and the
articulated limitations on what the insurer will provide by way of defense
(although the number of insureds who will not read their policies or know of
the change will be much larger). For example, any insured who perceives
liability insurance as the insurer's commitment to provide independent counsel
would dislike the content of clearer policies articulating the insured's
obligation to share counsel with the insurer, but there are many limitations in
insurance contracts that insureds do not like. Nor is it necessary that the
insured comprehend each and every limitation in an insurance policy for the
limitation to be effective; if there is no unfair surprise to the insured's
reasonable expectations, the fact that the insured wants a defense on different
terms is not enough to expand the insurer's obligations.
One last question raised by the prospect of clearer policy language
deserves our attention: is it possible that clearer contracts would eliminate the
need for defense counsel to obtain the insured's separate consent to joint
representation? In other words, would the Silver-Syverud contention that
consent to dual representation occurs at the time the request for the defense is
made be correct if the language of the insurance contracts were clearer?
Obviously, if these questions could be answered in the affirmative, the case for
modifying the existing relevant language would be overwhelming. The extent
to which clear language in a standardized form is binding on the recipient who
manifests assent to it is a complex question. 42 However one answers it, a more
pragmatic concem is whether the party who drafts the form can count on courts
enforcing it in accordance with its clear terms. The answer to this last question
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from case to case, but the lessons
of nearly a half-century of litigation over standardized forms gives little
security to a person who has drafted what he or she thinks is a clear form. If
this did not provide enough caution, the fact remains that counsel is not a party
142. For the general parameters relevant to the question, see supra notes 45-65 and
accompanying text.
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to the contract between insurer and insured. Thus, whatever the insured might
manifest to the insurer, this assent does not fulfill the attorney's independent
professional responsibilities, 143 which require counsel to make an independent
judgment about the situation and to obtain the client's consent after
consultation-which necessarily cannot occur until after the time of
contracting, a request for defense by the insured, and the appointment of
defense counsel. Prudence would suggest, therefore, that even with clear
contract language, defense counsel should seek and obtain the insured's
informed expression of assent to the dual representation.
143. See Barker, supra note 120, at 76 ("an adhesion contract cannot itself constitute
informed consent").
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APPENDIX
DEFENSE AND SETTLEMENT LANGUAGE IN
MODERN LIABILITY INSURANCE FORMS:
EXCERPTS FROM POLICY FORMS IN MILLER -S
STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED
The insurance policies from which the following excerpts are taken are
Insurance Service Office, Inc. ("ISO") forms reprinted with the permission of
the ISO in Susan J. Miller & Philip Lefebvre, Miller's Standard Insurance
Policies Annotated. 144
1. Personal Auto Policy, PP 00 0112 89 (1988) 141
INSURING AGREEMENT
A ..... We will settle or defend, as we consider appropriate, any claim or
suit asking for these damages. In addition to our limit of liability, we will pay
all defense costs we incur. Our duty to settle or defend ends when our limit of
liability for this coverage has been exhausted. We have no duty to defend any
suit or settle any claim for "bodily injury" or "property damage" not covered
under this policy.
2. Homeowners Composite Form, HO 00 03 04 91 (1990)146
Section H-Liability Coverages
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an "insured" for damages
because of "bodily injury" or "property damage" caused by an "occurrence" to
which this coverage applies, we will:
144. 1 MILLER'S POLICiEs ANNOT., supra note 79. According to Miller and Lefebvre, the
forms in Volume I are "the most widely used and litigated forms." Id. at User's Guide at 1.
145. Id. at 1.
146. Id. at 199. The Homeowners Composite Form is "a composite of six homeowners
forms which differ somewhat in the property coverage they provide." Id.
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1. Pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the "insured"
is legally liable. Damages include prejudgment interest awarded against the
"insured"; and [coverage for punitive damages awarded against an insured.]
2. Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice, even if the
suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent. We may investigate and settle any claim
or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our duty to settle or defend ends when
the amount we pay for damages resulting from the "occurrence" equals our
limit of liability.
3. Commercial General Liability (Occurrence) Form, CG 00 01 10 93
(1992) 141
COVERAGE A. BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE
LIABILITY
1. Insuring Agreement.
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to
pay as damages because of "bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this
insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend any "suit"
seeking those damages. We may at our discretion investigate any "occurrence"
and settle any claim or "suit" that may result. But:
(2) Our right and duty to defend end when we have used up the applicable
limit of insurance in the payment of judgments or settlements under Coverages
A or B or medical expenses under Coverage C.
147. Id. at 409. Identical language to that presented here is found in the claims-made
version of the form. See Commercial General Liability Form-Claims Made Coverage, CG 00
02 10 93 (1992), id. at 421. Also, identical language is found, with some differences in
language describing the scope of the coverage, in the following forms: Owners and Contractors
Protective Liability Coverage Form--Coverage for Operations of Designated Contractor, CG
00 09 10 93 (1992), id. at 429; Liquor Liability Coverage (Occurrence) Policy, CG 00 33 10
93 (1992), id. at 435; Liquor Liability Coverage (Claims-Made) Policy, CG 00 33 10 93 (1992),
id. at 440.0; Railroad Protective Liability Coverage Form, CG 00 35 10 93 (1992), id. at 440.4;
Products/Completed Operations Liability Coverage (Occurrence) Form, CG 00 37 10 93
(1992), id. at 441.0; Products/Completed Operations Liability Coverage (Claims-Made) Form,
CG 00 38 10 93 (1992), at 441.8; Pollution Liability Coverage Form Designated Sites, CG 00
39 10 93 (1992), id. at 442.3.
[Vol. 4:1I
RESPONSIBILITIES OF DEFENSE COUNSEL
4. Massachusetts Automobile Insurance Policy, 6th ed., 222-0806
(1993)148
2. Our Duty to Defend You and Our Right to Settle. We have the right to
defend any lawsuit brought against anyone covered under this policy for
damages which might be payable under this policy. We also have a duty to
defend any lawsuit, but our duty to defend ends when we offer, tender, or pay
to any claimant the maximum limits of coverage under this policy. We may
end our duty to defend at any time during the course of the lawsuit, by offering,
tendering, or paying the maximum limits of coverage under the policy, without
the need for a judgment or settlement of the lawsuit or a release by the
claimant.
We have the right to settle any claim or lawsuit as we see fit. If any person
covered under this policy settles a claim without our consent, we will not be
bound by that settlement.
5. Farmers Comprehensive Personal Liability Policy, HO-73 (Ed. 4-
80) 1 4 9
Section H-Liability Coverage
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages
because of bodily injury or property damage to which this coverage applies,
we will:
a. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is
legally liable; and
b. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice. We may
make any investigation and settle any claim or suit that we decide is
appropriate. Our obligation to defend any claim or suit ends when the amount
we pay for damages resulting from the occurrence equals our limit of liability.
148. Id. at 13.
149. Id. at 247.
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6. Business Auto Coverage Form, CA 00 01 12 90 (1990)15 °
Section II-Liability Coverage
A. Coverage
We have the right and duty to defend any "suit" asking for such damages
or a "covered pollution cost or expense." However, we have no duty to defend
"suits" for "bodily injury" or "property damage" or a "covered pollution cost
or expense" not covered by this Coverage Form. We may investigate and settle
any claim or "suit" as we consider appropriate. Our duty to defend or settle
ends when the Liability Coverage Limit of Insurance has been exhausted by
payment of judgments or settlements.
7. Garage Coverage Form, CA 00 05 12 90 (1990)'
We have the right and duty to defend any "suit" asking for these damages.
However we have no duty to defend "suits" for "bodily injury" or "property
damage" or a "covered pollution cost or expense" not covered by this Coverage
Form. We may investigate and settle any claim or "suit" as we consider
appropriate. Our duty to defend or settle ends when the applicable Liability
Coverage Limit of Insurance-"Garage Operations" - Other Than Covered
"Autos" has been exhausted by payment ofjudgments or settlements.
8. Physicians, Surgeons and Dentists Professional Liability Insurance,
GL 00 11 01 73 (1973)152
I. COVERAGE AGREEMENTS
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of....
and the company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against
the insured seeking such damages, even if any of the allegations of the suit are
groundless, false or fraudulent, and may make such investigation and, with the
written consent of the insured, such settlement of any claim or suit as it deems
expedient, but the company shall not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment
150. Id. at 259.
151. Id. at 264. Except for language referring to the content of the policy, identical text
is found in the Truckers Coverage Form, CA 00 12 12 90 (1990). See id. at 270.
152. Id. at 453. 1.
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or to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the company's liability has
been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.
9. Physicians, Surgeons and Dentists Professional Liability Insurance,
GL 00 12 03 81 (1981)15
I. COVERAGE AGREEMENTS
The company will pay on behalf of the insured [all sums...]
The company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the
insured seeking damages because of such injury even if any of the allegations
of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent. The company may make such
investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient. The
company shall not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment or to defend any
suit after the applicable limit of the company's liability has been exhausted by
payment of judgments or settlements.
10. Lawyers Professional Liability Insurance, GL 00 23 03 81
(1981)' 14
1. COVERAGE-LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
The company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the
insured seeking damages for claims to which this insurance applies even if any
of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent. The company
may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems
expedient. The company shall not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment
or to defend or continue to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the
company's liability has been exhausted by payment of judgment, settlements
or claims expenses.
153. Id. at 453.2.
154. Id. at 453.8. The claims-made version of this form has identical language to the
paragraph quoted above. See Lawyers Professional Liability Insurance (Claims Made), GL 00
24 03 81 (1981), id. at 454.0.
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